Whether to allow the presence of family members during cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) has been a highly contentious topic in recent years. Even though a great deal of evidence and professional guidelines support the option of family presence during resuscitation (FPDR), many healthcare professionals still oppose it. One of the main arguments espoused by the latter is that family members should not be allowed for the sake of the patient's best interests, whether it is to increase his chances of survival, respect his privacy or leave his family with a last positive impression of him. In this paper, we examine the issue of FPDR from the patient's point of view. Since the patient requires CPR, he is invariably unconscious and therefore incompetent. We discuss the Autonomy Principle and the Three-Tiered process for surrogate decision making, as well as the Beneficence Principle and show that these are limited in providing us with an adequate tool for decision making in this particular case. Rather, we rely on a novel principle (or, rather, a novel specification of an existing principle) and a novel integrated model for surrogate decision making. We show that this model is more satisfactory in taking the patient's true wishes under consideration and encourages a joint decision making process by all parties involved.

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BackgroundAlthough some of the most radical hypothesis related to the practical implementations of human enhancement have yet to become even close to reality, the use of cognitive enhancers is a very tangible phenomenon occurring with increasing popularity in university campuses as well as in other contexts. It is now well documented that the use of cognitive enhancers is not only increasingly common in Western countries, but also gradually accepted as a normal procedure by the media as well. In fact, its implementation is not unusual in various professional contexts and it has its peak in colleges (where the trend has been characterized as “academic doping”). Even when certain restrictions in the legislation of a country are indeed in place (i.e. through prescriptions requirements), they are without doubts easy to overcome. The legitimacy and appropriateness of such restrictions will not be the focus of our investigation.DiscussionOur concern is instead related to the moral and social reasons to publicly acknowledge the use of cognitive enhancers in competitive-selective contexts. These reasons are linked to a more neutral analysis of contemporary Western society: it is a fact that an increasing number of competitive-selective contexts have a substantial number of contenders using cognitive enhancers.SummaryThrough the use of five explicative examples, in this paper we want to analyse the problems related to its use. In particular, it will be our aim to show the tension between one of the main argument used by bio-liberals (the use of cognitive enhancers is an eligible procedure that society does not impose on anyone) and the actual implementation of the drugs in competitive, or semi-competitive contexts.

The year 2015 has been a decisive year for the future of mitochondrial replacement therapy (MRT)at least in the Western world. Currently, the UK and the US governments are undergoing a process of ethical and scientific evaluation of the technique to decide whether to allow its implementation or not. MRT requires the fusion of the DNA of three parents (although of a minimal percentage in the case of one of the two female genitors) into an embryoand this creates a number of worries as to what this scientific innovation will lead to. These worries might be well placed and worthy of consideration, but not on the grounds presented by some opponents. In this paper, we will analyse a recent European Union (EU) petition that urged the UK government (but which could be applied to the US government as well) to refrain from legalising MRT, stressing that other techniques, such as preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD), already have a more direct eugenic potential than MRT. Although the UK Parliament recently voted in favour of MRT, an analysis of the EU petition can nonetheless still contribute to understanding some of the key aspects of the debate. Our conclusion is that what seems to be really at stake, instead, is whether or not we are willing to reconceptualise our notion of parenthood as something not necessarily binominal and genetically related.