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Public debate on higher education reform today is dominated by competing views about what higher education institutions, particularly universities, are or should become. To a surprising extent, these views are based upon highly simplified characterisations of university history. The claims in question have been repeated so often that they have become clichés. Historical research has challenged all these conventional claims. The article aims to acquaint readers with the most important of these challenging results. Central here is an analysis of The Humboldt Myth about the rise of the modern research university in Germany and its alleged export to the US, and of the reasons why that myth remains so powerful, even though it has very little relation to realities on the ground. A second goal is to try to bring out some of the implications that a revision of standard views of higher education history might have for current policy debates, focusing in particular on the Bologna process.

The rise of large-scale laboratory research in nineteenth-century Germany has often been portrayed as a continuous success story. Taken as indicative are the two sciences on the leading edge of the trend, chemistry and physiology; developments in biology, physics, and the technical fields are then depicted either as imitations of or as the results of knowledge or personnel transfer from the leading disciplines. At first glance, the founding in 1879 of the world's first continuously operating psychological laboratory in Leipzig by Wilhelm Wundt, a physiologist turned philosopher, seems to fit this model very well. In one study, Joseph Ben-David and Randall Collins assert that this instance of “role hybridization,” as they call it, marked experimental psychology's “take-off into sustained growth” as a scientific discipline.

What roles have instruments played in psychology and related disciplines? How have instruments affected the dynamics of psychological research, with what possibilities and limits? What is the psychological instrument? This article provides a conceptual foundation for specific case studies concerning such questions. The discussion begins by challenging widely accepted assumptions about the subject and analyzing the general relations between scientific experimentation and the uses of instruments in psychology. Building on this analysis, a deliberately inclusive definition of what constitutes a psychological instrument is proposed. The discussion then takes up the relation between instrumentation and theories and differentiates in greater detail the roles instruments have had over the course of psychology's history. Finally, the authors offer an approach to evaluating the possibilities and limitations of instruments in psychology.