This article analyzes the role of causation in Canadian tort law. The author uses the recent Supreme Court of Canada decision of Athey v. Leonati as a model to show how even complex problems of causation can be solved through the application of fundamental principles of tort law: the "restoration" principle, the "take your victim" principle, and the "vicissitudes" principle. The author also demonstrates the importance of distinguishing types of causes based on the following dichotomies: tortious and non-tortious, sufficient and insufficient, and simultaneous and successive. The author argues that applying these principles, and distinguishing causes in this manner, will greatly simplify the resolution of even seemingly complex problems of causation in tort law.

This chapter examines the danger that, without proper appreciation of the underlying philosophical foundations of the subject, courts are apt to use the action in unjust enrichment to serve individualized notions of ‘justice’. It begins with an explanation of the principle of corrective justice that generally is thought to underlie the law of unjust enrichment. It then examines the extent to which courts in different jurisdictions have adhered to those foundations. First, because English courts have remained close to the principle of corrective justice, they seldom have resolved restitutionary claims by reference to intuitive notions of fairness or justice. Second, because Canadian courts occasionally have lost sight of the principle of corrective justice, they occasionally view cases of unjust enrichment as opportunities for achieving ‘equitable’ results on the basis of judicial discretion. Third, because of the effects of the American realist movement, American courts frequently have used the principle of unjust enrichment as a means of securing largely political goals of ‘social justice’.

This article takes an in-depth look at the law clerks and the role they play at the Supreme Court of Canada. Such an examination both informs prospective clerks on the nature of the position and promotes a better general understanding of how the judicial process operates at this level. The authors begin their analysis by looking at the history of the law clerks at the Supreme Court. Although the functions of the clerks have changed little since their introduction in 1968, the clerkship program has evolved with a changing Supreme Court, contributing to the institutions "coming of age." The authors then shift their attention to examining the present clerkship program. The article first reveals the manner in which the clerks are selected by the Court. Using data collected by a questionnaire sent to clerks of the 1991-93 terms, the authors also attempt to convey, in a general way, some sense of the people who have served at the Court in recent years. Next, the major functions performed by the clerks are described. While the clerks do have a great deal of responsibility, the authors dispel much of the criticism directed at United States Supreme Court clerks by stating that the law clerks at the Supreme Court of Canada do not have an improper degree of authority. The authors conclude that the clerking experience benefits both the clerks themselves and the procedures of the Court. As such, the law clerks are an entrenched and indispensable part of the judicial process at the Supreme Court of Canada.

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