published version features the final layout of the paper including the volume, issue and page numbers. Link to publication General rightsCopyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.• Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research. • You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain • You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal.If the publication is distributed under the terms of Article 25fa of the Dutch Copyright Act, indicated by the "Taverne" license above, please follow below link for the End User

This paper considers the Gale–Shapley model with interdependent preferences. Women’s preferences over men are common knowledge but whether or not a man is acceptable depends on the preferences of men which are private information. It is shown that no ex-post incentive-compatible and ex-post stable matching rules exist. A characterization of ex-post incentive-compatible, ex-post individually rational and ex-post nonbossy matching rules in terms of modified priority rules is provided.

With the increased radio frequency identification (RFID) applications different authentication schemes have been proposed in order to meet the required properties. In this paper we analyze the security of a server-less RFID authentication protocol which is proposed by Deng et al. in 2014. Deng et al. proposed an improvement over Hoque et al. protocol to overcome its vulnerability against data desynchronization attack. However, in this paper we show that their protocol is still vulnerable against data desynchronization attack. Furthermore we present an improved version of this protocol to prevent this attack.

No abstract

Auctioning an asset with sealed bids has been shown to be economically optimal but requires trusting an auctioneer who analyzes the bids and determines the winner. Many privacy preserving computation protocols for auctions have been proposed, aiming at eliminating the need for a trusted third party. However, they lack fairness, meaning that the adversary learns the outcome of the auction before honest parties and may choose to make the protocol fail without suffering any consequences. In this work, we propose efficient protocols for both first and second price sealed bid auctions with fairness against rational adversaries, leveraging secret cryptocurrency transactions and public smart contracts. In our approach, the bidders jointly compute the winner of the auction while preserving the privacy of losing bids and ensuring that cheaters are financially punished by losing a secret collateral deposit. We guarantee that it is never profitable for rational adversaries to cheat by making the deposit equal to the bid plus the cost of running the protocol, i.e., once a party commits to a bid it is guaranteed that it has the funds and it cannot walk away from the protocol without forfeiting the bid. Moreover, our protocols guarantee that the winner is determined and the auction payments are completed even if the adversary misbehaves, so that it cannot force the protocol to fail and then rejoin the auction with an adjusted bid. Our constructions are more efficient than the state-of-the-art even though they achieve stronger security guarantees, i.e., fairness. Interestingly, we show how the second price can be computed with a minimal increase of the complexity of the simpler first price case. Moreover, in case there is no cheating, only collateral deposit and refund transactions must be sent to the smart contract, significantly saving on-chain storage.