It is widely believed that power activates the behavioral approach system (Guinote, ; Keltner, Gruenfeld, & Anderson, ); however, findings are inconsistent. Here we discuss evidence suggesting that perceived threats to control in the power domain are key determinants of the association between power and approach motivation. We propose that objective or subjective threats to the exercise of power trigger behavioral inhibition, conflicts between approach and behavioral inhibition, and reactive, negatively valenced approach motivation. Furthermore, threatened power holders reassert power—in particular by using coercion—as defense against threat. We discuss literature in support of these hypotheses involving external threats (e.g., instability, illegitimacy, and uncertainty) and subjective states (anxiety, motivation to maintain power, perceived incompetence, submissiveness, and perceptions of low power) that trigger the perception of lack of control in the power domain and undermine the positive tone of power holders' approach motivation.

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Power affects how people think about moral issues, and has been found to elicit deontological moral judgments. We hypothesized that powerholders' propensity to rely on intuitive thinking would trigger deontological moral choices. In two studies, power was induced by role simulation tasks and participants then made a judgment on a moral dilemma that did not involve bodily harm. In Study 1 memory cognitive load was manipulated to induce an intuitive processing style, and in Study 2 deliberation was induced by asking participants to deliver strong arguments. Results of Study 1 show that high power led to deontological judgments regardless of cognitive load, and cognitive load enhanced deontological preferences among powerless individuals. In Study 2 we found that deliberation shifted the judgments of powerholders toward utilitarianism. These results extend prior findings and reinforce the links between power and deontology. The findings suggest that powerholders' preference for deontological moral judgments is driven by their reliance on intuitive thinking.

This research investigated how mental fatigue is associated with moral judgments during the COVID-19 pandemic and studied the moderating effect of social support. We used self-report questionnaires to collect data from 4,042 people. We assessed people's mental fatigue and social support during the pandemic, and designed nine moral dilemmas based on the background of COVID-19 to measure people's moral judgments. The results showed that during the COVID-19 pandemic mental fatigue had a significant impact on moral judgments. Individuals with higher mental fatigue were more likely to make more utilitarian choices, while social support moderated the relationship between mental fatigue and moral judgments. When experiencing mental fatigue, individuals with low, compared to high, social support are more likely to rely on utilitarianism to make moral judgments.