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The list of 13 fabrication site hazardous activities has been derived from focusing on the areas where significant incidents or near misses with fatality potential have occurred, while also taking into account existing safety practices common within the industry. Analysis of 10 years of IOGP incident data validated the final selection of the recommended practices by the IOGP Task Force. The IOGP Fabrication Site Construction Safety (FSCS) Recommended Practices document will provide standardized minimum requirements for addressing safety risks associated with the 13 listed hazardous activities, as well as a general section that addresses site-wide requirements. The objective of the FSCS Recommended Practices is to support the use of fabrication site specific construction practices that meet or exceed the requirements of the IOGP Recommended Practices, independently of the customer. This paper uses the on-going development of the IOGP FSCS Recommended Practices as a case study on how to drive for greater industry consistency to achieve a safer work environment and to remove inefficiencies.

This paper provides an overview of the key aspects of the International Oil and Gas Producers (IOGP) Association Fabrication Site Construction Safety Practices standardization initiative. It outlines the intent behind this initiative and the benefits that adoption and implementation of the IOGP-577 Fabrication SiteConstruction Safety Practices could bring to operators, EPCMs, contractors, and wider industry. The paper also provides a summary of the Construction Safety Practices developed as the result of this initiative and describes how this initiative could be implemented across IOGP member companies who formed the task force for this initiative. The paper further describes the tactics recommended for wider industry adoption. This paper acknowledges the contribution of the following individuals, representing IOGP Fabrication Site Construction Safety Task Force: S. Bergeron, Kosmos Energy; K. Cruickshank, Oil & Gas UK; S. Devincq, Total; G. Gratz, ExxonMobil Development Company; A. Mugno, Chevron; D. Stroud, Kosmos Energy; S. Sotoudehmanesh, Statoil; J. Trapp, BP; A. Burton, Shell International Trading and Shipping Company;

This paper discusses the complete cycle of the development, adoption and implementation of the IOGP fabrication site construction safety recommended practices for hazardous activities, as well as supporting enabling activities, and reference library. It also describes a world class example of sharing learnings and best practices across industry to improve safety performance of contractors and subcontractors, making construction safety standardization business as usual. Adoption statements from senior management within IOGP task force companies are shared in this paper. Implementation of IOGP-577 for the execution of project within a major oil and gas company is illustrated as a case study.

Shell designed, is building, and will operate Mars B Project Olympus TensionedLeg Platform (TLP) with Drilling and Completion Platform Rig to produce 100MBOPD oil and 100MMSCFD gas. Protecting people and environment is the toppriority for Shell. Initial design assumptions for Passive Fire Protection(PFP) application and blast design to protect people could result in the needfor significantly high weight allowances. Therefore, there is a need to find acomprehensive and structured approach to optimize PFP and blast mitigation todeliver reasonable weight allowances. This paper demonstrates how, through the use of practical safety assessments, weight allowances for PFP application and blast design can be optimized. Itdescribes how the Mars B Project was able to demonstrate As Low as ReasonablyPracticable (ALARP) risks for the design of critical systems for Major Hazardson the Olympus TLP. Major Hazards such as blowout fires, large wellbayexplosions, and process releases are addressed. Optimization of PFPrequirements and blast mitigation is demonstrated for critical systems such asthe Temporary Refuge (TR), Drill rig, Flare Boom, Primary Structures, ProcessVessels, Occupied Buildings, and Crane. In the case of the Drill Rig, fire andblast assessment is aligned with a key recommendation from the United StatesCoast Guard Deepwater Deepwater Horizon investigation report. Credible Design Scenarios are identified for Major Accident Hazards (MAHs) andused to assess the inherent strength of the proposed design through FireDegradation, Blast Structural Assessment, and TR Impairment studies. Whennecessary design improvements were identified, further work was undertaken tooptimize PFP application and blast resistance while delivering an ALARP design. In the process, full consideration was given to minimizing design changes, saving weight, and reducing maintenance problems during the life of thefacility. In some instances this produced a superior result relative to initialengineering assumptions about PFP application and blast design.