In 2002, the European Union (EU) Parliament passed a regulation that requires consolidated and simple accounts for all companies listed in the EU to use International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) for fiscal years starting after 1 January 2005. This change in accounting systems will have a large impact on the information environment for EU companies. This paper provides a review of the literature on adoption of different Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP). We thus provide background and guidance for researchers studying the change in accounting quality following widespread IFRS adoption in the EU. We argue that cross-country differences in accounting quality are likely to remain following IFRS adoption because accounting quality is a function of the firm's overall institutional setting, including the legal and political system of the country in which the firm resides.

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We extend the literature on earnings management through real operating decisions by providing insight into the types of expenditures (core versus noncore and operating versus non-operating activities) affected by earnings management. We partition a sample of California nonprofit hospitals based on their earnings management incentives. We find that expenditures on non-operating and non-revenue-generating activities appear to decrease in hospitals with incentives to engage in such behavior, while core patient care activities remain unchanged. We also find evidence of earnings management in non-core operational expenses. Second, we analyze real earnings management related to pay-for-performance incentives and find that hospitals with stronger performance incentives exhibit a significant incremental decrease in expenditures. Finally, we examine two different kinds of behavior to discriminate between earnings management and good operational decisions and provide weak evidence to support opportunism rather than good management. Together, these results provide evidence of the use of real operating decisions to manage earnings.

Beginning with Anderson, Banker, and Janakiraman (2003), a rapidly growing body of literature attributes the short-run asymmetric cost response to activity changes (i.e., sticky costs) resulting from short-run managerial choices. In this paper, we are agnostic on the theory of sticky costs. Rather, we focus on empirical tests of cost stickiness. We show that past decisions on cost structure, which determine the magnitude of costs controllable in the short-term, induce non-stationarity in the elasticity of Sales, General, and Administrative costs, affecting the interpretation of estimates from the standard specification used in the literature. We develop suggestions for how future research might control for the effects of cost structure. Empirically, we find that cost structure confounds results usually interpreted as cost stickiness reflecting short-run managerial actions. After adjusting for the effects of fixed costs, we find that the results are unstable across alternate subsamples. Our results provide evidence that long-run cost structure decisions impact our ability to detect short-term cost management decisions. JEL Classifications: M41; L42

the 2000 MAR conference, and the anonymous reviewer for comments. This paper was previously titled "On the Behavior of Labor Cost in Therapy Clinics."1. Other research examining the stickiness of costs include Subramaniam and Weidenmier (2002) and Wiersma (2002).2. We define a large change as any change greater than 3 percent. Approximately 75 percent of all changes were less than +. 7 percent, reducing concerns that observations lie outside of the relevant range.