W e inquire whether residence in majority-minority districts raises or lowers turnout among Latinos. We argue that the logic suggesting that majority-minority districts suppress turnout is flawed and hypothesize that the net effect is empowering. Further, we suggest that residing in multiple overlapping majority-minority districts-for state assemblies, senates, and the U.S. Housefurther enhances turnout. We test our hypotheses using individual-level turnout data for voters in five Southern California counties. Examining three general elections from 1996 to 2000, we demonstrate that residing in a majority-Latino district ultimately has a positive effect on the propensity of Latino voters to turn out, an effect that increases with the number of Latino districts in which the voter resides and is consistent across the individual offices in which a voter might be descriptively represented. In contrast, the probability that non-Hispanic voters turn out decreases as they are subject to increasing layers of majority-Latino districting.

Divided government provides ambiguous and conflicting information about which branch of government to hold accountable for government performance. The implication for presidents, who are easy targets of blame, is that they are less likely to be held accountable for government's failures during periods of divided government because the public has a plausible alternative for affixing responsibility: the U.S. Congress. Because presidents are punished more heavily for negative outcomes than they are rewarded for favorable ones, we argue that a divided government context has the effect of increasing presidential approval relative to periods of unified government. At the individual level, using data from the 1972-1994 National Election Studies we show that divided government increases the probability that respondents approve of a president's job performance. This effect is even stronger among citizens who are knowledgeable about control of government. Examining approval at the aggregate level from 1949 to 1996, we find further evidence that divided government boosts presidential approval ratings.The authors wish to thank Richard A. Brody, Ross A. Miller, Daniel Ponder, Craig Volden, and the anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments and suggestions.1 This is not to suggest that the national government as a whole is less productive (Mayhew 1991); rather that the product is less to the president's liking.

Most research on Latino voting behavior conclusively finds that as a group, Latinos vote at lower rates than other racial and ethnic groups in the United States. In this article, we argue that given the appropriate circumstances, Latinos should be expected to vote at higher rates than other racial and ethnic groups. In particular, we think the presence of a viable Latino candidate will spur increased Latino turnout and that when Latinos candidates run for office, Latino voters will prefer the co-ethnic candidate. Analyzing precinct level returns from the Los Angeles 2001 mayoral and the 2000 presidential elections we show this may be the case. High-density Latino precincts show higher rates of turnout when Latino candidates are on the ballot, and these same precincts show heightened support for the co-ethnic candidate. In fact, for the first time ever in Los Angeles, the 2001 mayoral election witnessed Latinos voting at the highest rates of any racial or ethnic group in the city.

Objectives. The 1990s witnessed the growth and maturation of the Latino electorate in California and many scholars have posited as to the reasons. One argument is that naturalizations by way of the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) drove the increases in Latino participation. In this article we investigate the extent to which this is the case. Methods. Using unpublished INS data, we offer the first empirical test of the IRCA theory by examining Latino IRCA petitions by zipcode to determine whether or not IRCA legalizations and subsequent naturalizations were the force behind increased Latino turnout, and the overall growth of the Latino vote. We merge IRCA data with Registrar of Voter data to examine real growth in the Latino vote at the zipcode level from 1996–2000 in southern California. Results. Although Latino voting grew substantially, we find that IRCA naturalizations did not spur the increases in Latino voting in the 1990s as some have expected. Instead, demographic and mobilization variables explain why the Latino vote grew between 1996 and 2000. Conclusions. As Congress debates new proposals to “legalize” the millions of undocumented immigrants living and working in this country, many will inevitably ask what impact their citizenship will have on the electorate. This study sheds some light on the relationship between amnesty programs, citizenship, and voting among Latinos.

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