War of attrition, Profit, Advertising, Concentration dynamics, Brewing industry, L11, L66, M37,

In this update we document the changes in industry concentration of macro and micro brewers in the U.S. brewing industry since 1970. Technological change and the continued success of Anheuser–Busch forced the macro brewers into a war-of-attrition game and contributed to rising concentration in the macro sector of the industry. Homogenization of the beer produced by macro brewers, changes in local demand conditions, and a more favorable regulatory environment created profitable niches in many local markets for micro brewery beer, and entry into this sector occurred at a phenomenal rate from 1977 to 1998. Consistent with several models of industry dynamics, over-exuberance led to a shakeout as the number of micro breweries fell by over 16% from 1998 to 2002. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 2005brewing industry, concentration, micro breweries, L11 and L66,

The relationship between advertising and price is important because the welfare effect of advertising depends upon the price effect of advertising. We attempt to provide a better understanding of the theoretical relationship between advertising and price. We establish theoretical conditions sufficient for advertising to raise prices. This will occur, for example, when firms play a supermodular game – a structure that considers the type of advertising (i.e., persuasive, image creating, or informative) and the effect that advertising has on a firm’s demand and costs. We also compare results from two simple duopoly models, one with horizontal and the other with vertical differentiation, and find that only the model with horizontal differentiation is supermodular for the forms of advertising that are thought to raise price (e.g., persuasive advertising). In consideration of these theoretical issues, we then develop an empirical model to determine whether advertising raises prices in the US brewing and cigarette industries.Advertising, Price, Supermodularity, Brewing Industry, Cigarette Industry, L13, L66, M37,

Because of the high social cost of cigarette smoking, many countries impose advertising restrictions to reduce cigarette consumption. Yet previous studies conclude that advertising constraints have been ineffective at reducing cigarette smoking. This conclusion is incorrect because it ignores the fact that advertising restrictions have supply as well as demand effects. The authors extend existing research by showing that advertising regulations, especially those found in the recent National Tobacco Settlement, have decreased the equilibrium level of cigarette consumption in the United States, a result that holds for both myopic and rational addiction models.

Efficiency, Advertising regulations, LeChatelier principle, Coordination in advertising, U.S. cigarette industry, D61, L51, M37,