Research on the effects of emotions and moods on judgments of legal responsibility and blame is reviewed. Emotions and moods may influence decision makers in 3 ways: by affecting their information processing strategies, by inclining their judgments in the direction of the valence of the emotion or mood, and/or by providing informational cues to the proper decision. A model is proposed that incorporates these effects and further distinguishes among various affective influences in terms of whether the affect is provoked by a source integral or incidental to the judgment task, and whether it affects judgment directly (e.g., by providing an informational cue to judgment) or indirectly (e.g., by affecting construal of judgment target features, which in turn affects the judgment). Legal decision makers' abilities to correct for any affective influences they perceive to be undesirable and normative implications for legal theory and practice are briefly discussed.

We studied the effects of accident victims' legal blameworthiness and the severity of their injuries on determinations of responsibility and damage awards. In general, participants tended to ascribe more fault to victims than warranted by the facts presented, displaying an antiplaintiff bias. When attributing fault and awarding damages, they were especially sensitive to the blameworthiness of the victim when the consequences of the accident were severe rather than mild. These findings appeared not to be mediated by emotional reactions to the victims. Participants tended to conflate issues of liability with what ought to have been the legally distinct question of damages. They appeared to decide comparative negligence awards not by determining percentage fault and gross damages as discrete items and then computing their product, as the law prescribes, but rather by using more holistic judgmental processes.

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This experiment studied the role of emotional arousal in mediating the impact of plaintiff and defendant blameworthiness and accident severity on comparative negligence judgments. Participants (N= 214) read descriptions and viewed photographs of 2 accident cases varying in outcome severity, victim blameworthiness, and defendant blameworthiness. Participants then rated their emotional responses to the cases, apportioned fault between the parties, and assessed gross and discounted damages. Blameworthiness and outcome severity affected apportionment of fault, and the effects of blameworthiness and severity appeared to be mediated by the arousal of anger toward the parties. Damage awards were determined primarily by the severity of the accident and were not mediated by emotional arousal.

Functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) is currently the most advanced technique for measuring and depicting brain function. Functional MRI studies abound in neuroscience, psychiatry and psychology. Inevitably, fMRI-based evidence will be offered in court as proof of matters involving parties’ mental states and capabilities. This paper analyses the likely admissibility of fMRI testimony and images. Cases involving other types of functional neuroimaging (PET and SPECT), which may shed light on judges’ receptivity to fMRI evidence, are briefly surveyed. The conceptual and methodological underpinnings of fMRI are then explored, prompting basic questions about the evidentiary reliability and relevance of fMRI results. The first reported case involving fMRI evidence, which raises several of these questions, is described. Finally, the admissibility and probative value of the fMRI images themselves are discussed. Assuming that the expert testimony that the images are offered to illustrate is admissible, it is argued that the law can obtain the benefits of fMRI science while minimising the judgmental risks by allowing triers of fact to see the images and encouraging experts and lawyers to educate the triers to interpret the images properly.