Cognitive psychological research focuses on causal learning and reasoning while cognitive anthropological and social science research tend to focus on systems of beliefs. Our aim was to explore how these two types of research can inform each other. Cognitive psychological theories (causal model theory and causal Bayes nets) were used to derive predictions for systems of causal beliefs. These predictions were then applied to lay theories of depression as a specific test case. A systematic literature review on causal beliefs about depression was conducted, including original, quantitative research. Thirty-six studies investigating 13 non-Western and 32 Western cultural groups were analyzed by classifying assumed causes and preferred forms of treatment into common categories. Relations between beliefs and treatment preferences were assessed. Substantial agreement between cultural groups was found with respect to the impact of observable causes. Stress was generally rated as most important. Less agreement resulted for hidden, especially supernatural causes. Causal beliefs were clearly related to treatment preferences in Western groups, while evidence was mostly lacking for non-Western groups. Overall predictions were supported, but there were considerable methodological limitations. Pointers to future research, which may combine studies on causal beliefs with experimental paradigms on causal reasoning, are given.

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In several recent papers and a monograph, Andreas Stokke argues that questions can be misleading, but that they cannot be lies. The aim of this paper is to show that ordinary speakers disagree. We show that ordinary speakers judge certain kinds of insincere questions to be lies, namely questions carrying a believed false presupposition the speaker intends to convey. These judgements are robust and remain so when the participants are given the possibility of classifying the utterances as misleading or as deceiving. The judgements contrast with judgements participants give about cases of misleading or deceptive behaviour, and they pattern with judgements participants make about declarative lies. Finally, the possibility of lying with non-declaratives is not confined to questions: ordinary speakers also judge utterances of imperative, exclamative and optative sentences carrying believed-false presuppositions to be lies.

Morality and causation are deeply intertwined. For instance, the value of anticipated consequences is a crucial input for an action's moral permissibility, and assigning blame or responsibility for outcomes generally requires that a causal link connect the outcome with a potentially blameworthy agent's action. Psychological theories of moral judgment acknowledge this, but an explicit connection to theories of causal reasoning, and to theories of reasoning about outcomes, is missing. In this thesis, I present the results of two research projects that investigated, respectively, how (a) features of the causal relations connecting actions and outcomes, and (b) observers' subjective value of consequences affect moral judgments. In the first project, we found that chain structures connecting actions and harmful outcomes, compared to direct causal relations, can lead to a lower perceived strength of the relation, and thereby to attributions of diminished outcome foreseeability to agents. This explains why moral judgments about actions and agents can be more lenient in chains compared to direct relations. In the second project, we proposed and evaluated a computational model of reasoning about outcome trade-offs in moral scenarios. The model predicts permissibility judgments about actions from observers' subjective utilities of the action's consequences, and it accounted well for participants' judgments in two experiments. I argue that an improved understanding of how features of causal relations and the value of outcomes affect moral judgments would advance any contemporary theory of moral reasoning. The findings presented in this thesis aim to contribute to such an improved understanding. I conclude by discussing how features of causal relations and utilities might be formally integrated in causal representations, and lay out directions for future research. Zusammenfassung Moral und Kausalität sind eng verwoben. So ist z.B. der Wert der erwarteten Folgen ein entscheidender Faktor für die moralische Zulässigkeit von Handlungen, und die Zuweisung von Schuld oder Verantwortung für Ereignisse setzt im Allgemeinen voraus, dass eine kausale Verbindung zwischen dem Ereignis und der Handlung einer Person besteht. Psychologische Theorien des moralischen Urteilens erkennen das zwar an, jedoch fehlen explizite Verbindungen zu Theorien des kausalen Denkens und zu Theorien der Bewertung von Folgen. In dieser Arbeit stelle ich die Ergebnisse von zwei Forschungsprojekten vor, in denen untersucht wurde, wie (a) Merkmale der kausalen Beziehungen zwischen Handlungen und Ereignissen und (b) die subjektive Bewertung von Konsequenzen moralische Urteile beeinflussen. Das erste Projekt zeigte, dass die Repräsentation von kausalen Kettenstrukturen zwischen Handlungen und Ereignissen im Vergleich zu direkten Kausalbeziehungen zu einer als geringer wahrgenommenen Stärke der Beziehung und damit zu Zuschreibungen einer geringeren Vorhersehbarkeit der Folgen an die Handelnden führen kann. Das erklärt, warum moralische Urteile bei Ketten nachsicht...