This paper investigates the reward-penalty mechanism (RPM) implemented by the government in a closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) with asymmetric information. The manufacturer produces and sells products to consumers, while the collection of waste electrical and electronic equipment (WEEE) is delegated to the third-party collector, the one who has private information about the collection effort level. An information screening contract for the manufacturer is put forward to obtain the private information from the third-party collector, which is composed of buy-back price and franchise fee. By utilizing principal-agent theory, two cases are mainly examined including the CLSC without the RPM and the CLSC with the RPM. The results demonstrate that (i) the information screening contract is effective in capturing the collector’s collection effort level, (ii) raising the buy-back price to motivate the third-party collector is confirmed to perform well on enhancing the collection quantity from consumers, (iii) H-type collector collects more WEEEs and earns more profits than L-type collector, and (iv) the RPM improves the collection quantity of the enterprise and reaps more environmental benefits. The numerical results verify the validity of the contract and the feasibility of the RPM.

We investigate the third-party collector’s private information in a dual-channel closed-loop supply chain (DCLSC). The manufacturer sells her products through both an e-channe l and retail channel and delegates the collection of waste electrical and electronic equipment (WEEE) to a third-party collector. The collector in a DCLSC has two types of private information: i.e., his collection effort level and collection ability. We develop principal–agent models to help the manufacturer design an information screening contract to obtain the collector’s asymmetric information. The results show that (i) an information screening contract can effectively prevent low ability collectors from misrepresenting their private information; (ii) although the increased awareness of environmental protection of consumers improves the manufacturer’s expected profit, it does not affect the retailer’s expected profit and the collector’s expected utility; (iii) the manufacturer’s expected profit enhances with the number of high ability collectors, whereas the expected utility of the high ability collector declines; (iv) the e-channel could not increase the total expected profit of the manufacturer and the retailer, but the channel transfers a part of the retailer’s expected profit to the manufacturer.

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