No abstract

A year of genomic surveillance reveals how the SARS-CoV-2 pandemic unfolded in Africa

While there have been no cases of type-2 wild poliovirus for over 20 years, transmission of type-2 vaccine-derived poliovirus (VDPV2) and associated paralytic cases in several continents represent a threat to eradication. The withdrawal of the type-2 component of oral poliovirus vaccine (OPV2) was implemented in April 2016 to stop VDPV2 emergence and secure eradication of all poliovirus type 2. Globally, children born after this date have limited immunity to prevent transmission. Using a statistical model, we estimate the emergence date and source of VDPV2s detected between May 2016 and November 2019. Outbreak response campaigns with monovalent OPV2 are the only available method to induce immunity to prevent transmission. Yet, our analysis shows that using monovalent OPV2 is generating more paralytic VDPV2 outbreaks with the potential for establishing endemic transmission. The novel OPV2 is urgently required, alongside a contingency strategy if this vaccine does not materialize or perform as anticipated.

The broad distribution of VDPVs in the province and their close genetic relationship indicate intense and rapid cocirculation and coevolution of the vaccine strains and of their related HEV-C strains. The occurrence of an outbreak due to VDPV 3 years after a previous outbreak indicates that a short period with low vaccination coverage is enough to create favorable conditions for the emergence of VDPV in this setting.