The term Ôanimal cognitionÕ refers to the scientific study of the mental lives of animals. To the extent that humans are animals then perhaps the term ÔanimalÕ is redundant, for who would claim that one could study cognition in a computer or a cucumber? And although there may be some debate as to which topics should be included within the general rubric of ÔcognitionÕ, it involves a variety of processes including the ability to learn and remember, to think rationally about a problem, to think about the way others think, and to communicate information to other individuals. So it is not surprising then that a book with the title ÔEmpirical and theoretical perspectives on animal cognitionÕ would contain a large array of topics on a wide selection of species, from ground squirrels and jumping spiders to parrots, olive baboons and ravens. Indeed diversity is the name of the game in this book, with contributions not only from comparative psychologists and ethologists, but also from philosophers, neuroscientists, computer scientists, modellers, and developmental psychologists, to name but a few; and the approaches taken by the various authors reflect this diversity in discipline, methodology, as well as the degree to which they accept or reject the question of whether animals are conscious.The book is divided into four sections, each of which contains a number of short essays by one of the experts in that area. The first section is entitled ÔThe diversity of cognitionÕ and contains 22 chapters, beginning with a theoretical approach by Crist, and by Rivas and Burghardt, followed by empirical overviews of specific research areas describing the behaviour of a number of species of invertebrates as well as vertebrates. There is also a comparison of human and animal minds by Saidel. Timberlake stresses the methodogical approach in an essay entitled ÔConstructing animal cognitionÕ, and an unusual chapter on ÔSynthetic ethology: a new tool for investigating animal cognitionÕ by MacLennan. Inevitably these chapters vary in quality, and some will appeal more than others depending on the reader's sympathies. I particularly liked the chapter by Godfrey-Smith.The second section of the book is considerably shorter, containing nine essays on ÔConcepts and categoriesÕ. This section includes Pepperberg's work on African grey parrots, Cook's work on pigeons, Schusterman's work on sea lions, and of course a number of chapters on primates by Matsuzawa, Brannon and Terrace, and Santos, Hauser and Spelke. I was surprised there was no chapter on concept formation in honey bees here, especially given the beautiful work of Giurfa and Menzel. I would also have liked to see a chapter by Fagot on functional categorization.The third section is entitled ÔCommunication, language and meaningÕ. This section is surprisingly short, relative to the rest of the book, with just eight essays, ranging from questions about vocal communication in primates, dolphins, prairie dogs and chickens, to the importance of gestures and sign language. To my taste, this se...
