The analogy between gift-giving and organ donation was first suggested at the beginning of the transplantation era, when policy makers and legislators were promoting voluntary organ donation as the preferred procurement procedure. It was believed that the practice of gift-giving had some features which were also thought to be necessary to ensure that an organ procurement procedure would be morally acceptable, namely voluntarism and altruism. Twenty-five years later, the analogy between gift-giving and organ donation is still being made in the literature and used in organ donation awareness campaigns. In this paper I want to challenge this analogy. By examining a range of circumstances in which gift-giving occurs, I argue that the significant differences between the various types of gift-giving and organ donation makes any analogy between the two very general and superficial, and I suggest that a more appropriate analogy can be found elsewhere.

The 1987 Amendment to the Infertility (Medical Procedures) Act (Vic) allows the creation of embryos specifically for research purposes, as long as the proposed experiment takes place within 24 hours. The purpose of this paper is to determine whether there is aany significant ethical difference between creating embryos specifically for research and using those that are surplus from the new reproductive technologies. The relevant arguments in this debate can be grouped under three heads: those focussing on the embryo; those focussing on the possible consequences of these practices and those focussing on the women who donate the eggs.

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Passages from the writings of Immanuel Kant concerning how a person should treat her body are often cited in the present-day debate about a market for human body parts. In this paper, I demonstrate that this has been a misuse of Kant because unlike those who cite him, Kant was not primarily concerned with prohibiting the sale of body parts. In the first section, I argue that once these particular passages are understood against the background of Kant's moral philosophy, they indicate he had much broader concerns relating to the correct moral relationship a rational person should have with her body. In the second section, I examine Stephen Munzer's unusually detailed analysis of these passages, but conclude that like those who have provided less detailed analyses, he also fails fully to understand the rationale for Kant's various prescriptions and prohibitions concerning the treatment of human body parts, and in doing so misrepresents Kant's position.