This paper examines a unique stock market monitoring program used by the Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) . When the ASX observes unusual share price or trading volume changes of a listed company, it sends a letter demanding an explanation. Companies need to respond publicly to several stylized questions. Such public communications between the stock exchange and listed companies contain information. This paper documents how companies respond to the ASX inquiry and how the market reacts to the replies. It is found that some companies do release new information to the market when asked. After the firm's reply is posted, the average trading volume and the bid-ask spread are reduced, and in most cases, the share price is also stabilized with the following two exceptions: (1) The price will continue to rally on average if the company releases only partial information when questioned after a significant price jump; (2) The downward price trend will be reversed if the company states that no new information could explain the decline. Furthermore, there are statistically significant, positive abnormal returns for the first five trading days, which are not conditional upon the replies firms give to the ASX inquiries. Copyright 2007 The Author Journal compilation (c) 2007 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

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Employee matching grant schemes are coordination mechanisms that reduce free-riding by socially-conscious employee-donors. Their prevalence demonstrates that socially-responsible firms can survive market competition. When socially-conscious employees are more productive or value working together, matching schemes can enhance employee welfare and raise more for charities without reducing investor profits. We document higher labor productivity at firms with matching schemes and that matching firms are more likely to be ranked as one of the "100 Best Companies to Work For." The relation is robust to managerial entrenchment concerns and is not simply a reflection of productivity and preferences in the high-tech sector.

Q uality testing by suppliers has significant ramifications for downstream supply chain participants and retail consumers. This article focuses on such implications accounting for the fact that suppliers often enjoy discretion in quality testing and reporting. Under a discretionary testing and reporting environment, we show that a supplier can improve the market's perception of product quality by engaging in self-imposed production cuts. Production cuts dampen supplier incentives to engage in excessive quality testing, putting the supplier and the market on a more equal information footing. This reduces the market's need to skeptically discount product quality to protect itself. The improved market perception, then, reduces quality testing demand, introducing cost savings. The result that costly production cuts can improve quality perceptions indicates that the groundwork for influencing market perceptions may have to be laid upfront, even prior to acquiring private information, providing a contrast to routine signaling models.

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