The international community was criticized when it decided to intervene, as in Somalia, Bosnia and Kosovo, and when it did not intervene as in Rwanda. It was against this background that Kofi Annan argued, in September 1999, in the defense of the individual sovereignty over state sovereignty. He asked, ‘if humanitarian intervention is an unacceptable attack on sovereignty, how can we respond to cases as Rwanda or Srebrenica?’In this sense, with the recovery of Francis Deng’s 1996 “sovereignty as responsibility†concept, it would be possible to abrogate the categorical imperative of traditional sovereignty, allowing the international community to intervene when the state fails in its responsibility to protect its people against genocide, ethnic cleansing, crimes of war and against humanity.The study looks at the creation, development and eventual adoption of the ‘responsibility to protect’ (R2P) norm, from an idea promulgated in the 1990sto the development of the norm, and to the eventual adoption of a heavily restricted yet poignant principle at the 2005 World Summit. There is considerable debate over the status and scope of the Responsibility to Protect. On balance, most observers and states believe that it remains a political commitment and has not yet acquired legal force.The purpose of this study is to critically examine the UN’s responsibility to protect civilians in light of the intervention in the 2011 Libyan crisis. The responsibility to protect has been central in the discussion of how to deal with the Arab spring revolts that gave rise to civil war in Libya. In Libya, with the help of an UN authorized NATO intervention, the Gaddafi authoritarian regime ended and the former rebel forces are now leading the transitional process. Taking in to account the events in Libya, many have questioned whether the concept of R2P was used not only to protect civilians, but also to fulfill a desire, from the beginning of the mission, for regime change. However, the study argued that it was very difficult to enforce the very intents and objectives of Resolution 1973, because it was obvious enough that Gaddafi was prepared to continue to slaughter his people in a civil war to retain power. Thus, even if some argued that the NATO intervention in Libya acted beyond Resolution 1973, nevertheless, the study strongly argued that the intervening forces have indeed stopped Gaddafi from marching on Benghazi and saved thousands of lives.

The prohibition against the death penalty as applied to juveniles is widely practiced across the globe. The United Nations treaties have prescribed age requirements for extreme sentences such as the juvenile death penalty. Despite these requirements very few countries continue to sentence juveniles to the death penalty that ignore the age of the offender. The United States leads the world in state-sanctioned juvenile executions. However, recently the United States came into compliance with international norms and heralded a major shift by banning the death penalty as applied to juveniles in the Supreme Court case of Roper v. Simmons in 2005. Due to that, the overwhelming majority of states do not sentence juveniles to the death penalty and the prohibition against sentencing children to die has become accepted. On the contrary, for over three centuries, the United States executed juvenile delinquents and the Supreme Court, for a long time, held there was no national consensus rejecting juvenile executions and not a violation of the Eighth Amendment. The US is already a party to a number of fundamental human rights treaties that impact capital punishment. To some extent, the US has isolated itself from the most direct effects of these treaties through reservations or by invoking domestic law. But the US is committed to the underlying human rights principles of these treaties and these instruments can serve as a starting point for reforming and restricting the death penalty from a human rights perspective.

Nuruye Beyan, hereby declare that this research paper is original and has never been presented in any other institution. To the best of my knowledge and belief, I also declare that any information used has been duly acknowledged. 2.2.1.3.The Guiding Principles for Military Intervention____________ A. Just cause Principle____________________________ B. The Precautionary Principles_____________________ C. Right Authority_______________________________ 2.3. The United Nations and The Responsibility to Protect____________________ 2.3.1. A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility_____________________ 2.3.2. In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All, Report of the Secretary-General_______________________________ 2.3.3. The 2005 UN World Summit Outcome Document_____________________ 2.3.4. Other Relevant Documents______________________________________ 2.4. The Legal Status of the Responsibility to protect___________________________ CHAPTER THREE HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND THE CORE PRINCIPLES OF THE UN CHARTER IN LIGHT OF THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT 3.1. Introduction_______________________________________________________ 3.2. Humanitarian Intervention__________________________________________ 3.2.1. The Responsibility to Protect: Is a new name for Humanitarian Intervention? _____________________________________________ 3.3. The Core Principles of the UN Charter and the Responsibility to Protect 3.3.1. The principles of State Sovereignty and Non-intervention, and R2P__ 3.3.2. Prohibition of the Use of Force and R2P________________________ 3.3.3. Exceptions to Article 2, paragraph 4____________________________ A. Security Council Authorization____________________________ B. Individual or Collective Self-Defense_______________________ 8 CHAPTER FOUR THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY'S AND THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL'S RESPONSE TO THE LIBYAN CRISIS 4.1. Background to the Libyan Crisis _____________________________________ 4.2. The International Community's Initial Responses _______________________ 4.2.1. The Peace and Security Council of the African Union______________ 4.2.2. The Council of the League of Arab States_______________________ 4.2.3. The Council of the European Union____________________________ 4.2.4. The UN Security Council Resolution 1970______________________ 4.2.5. Other UN Bodies __________________________________________ 4.3. R2P in Action: The UNSC Resolution 1973 on Libya_____________________ 4.3.1. Responsibility to Protect in Security Council Resolution 1973_______ 4.3.1.1. Protection of Civilians and Civilian Populated Areas_____ 4.3.1.2. All Necessary Measures____________________________ 4.3.1.3. Notwithstanding Paragraph 9 and Excluding a Foreign Occupation Force_________________________________ 4.3.1.4. No Fly Zone_____________________________________ 4.3.2. Military Intervention and Regime change in Libya for the Protection of Civilians_________________________________________________ 4.3.3. The Responsibility to Protect: After Libya_______________________ 4.3.4. Chang...