How does economic performance affect support for democracy in emergent democracies? Government approval studies do not directly evaluate this. Recent literature suggests using separate assessments: Citizens in emergent democracies—through political trust—distinguish between government approval and democratic support. This article directly assesses the question for Asia’s democratizing nations of Taiwan, Thailand, South Korea, and the Philippines. Two results are relevant: First, economic performance explains government approval over time and across these democratizing nations. This result accords with findings from other regions to lend to the accumulation of knowledge from extending study to Asia. Second, economic performance does not explain democratic support; instead, political trust is statistically related to democratic support. Specifically, although political trust and economic performance both explain government approval, political trust outweighs economic conditions in explaining democratic support. These results show that by building political trust in the democratizing system, citizens may hold officials accountable while remaining committed to democratic development. Theoretically, then, this article synthesizes diverse findings in the literature to enrich theory building.

How does political trust affect the competing pressures of policy versus political performance in emergent democracies? Studies suggest that political trust buffers against these pressures, but empirical evidence is lacking in regard to if or how, given the focus in the literature on mature democracies where democratic institutions and practices are unlikely to be upended by either policy or political underperformance. However, in emergent democracies where the risks of democratic reversal loom large, the distinction is highly relevant. This article investigates how political trust matters in emergent democracies, specifically, if political trust buffers against public pressures, and whether it is system-directed versus incumbent-directed, for East and Southeast Asia. The evidence from multiple waves of survey data provides three useful insights: first, it shows that political trust supersedes economic expectations in support for the democratising system; this supports political trust as a buffer for the political system and is system-directed. Second, political trust goes hand-in-hand with economic performance to explain support for the incumbent government. This finding clarifies that political trust does not buffer the government against public pressure for performance. Third, taken together, the results show that economic growth may keep a government in office but institution-building leads to political trust that undergirds the political system, so that institution-building is a priority for stability in emergent democracies. These results expand the political trust literature to underpin democratic progression and consolidation issues that are unique to emergent democracies.

Do governments in less-democratic newly industrialized countries (NICs) bargain with their citizens? In this article we develop a game-theoretic model to show that the government may not be able to avoid bargaining in open economies such as the Asian NICs when economic conditions are less than optimal. The reason is that, in the absence of government bargaining, citizens acting rationally and strategically choose to withdraw resources such as labor or production investment from a weak economy. Under these circumstances, government bargaining to elicit resource investment is a sub-game perfect equilibrium outcome. To test the model, we analyze data on production investment in the Asian NICs of South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, and Malaysia from the 1960s to the 1990s. The analysis supports the prediction of the formal model and, hence, makes three contributions to the study of this topic. First, when we relax the assumption that citizens are naïve, governments in less-democratic open economies such as the Asian NICs may not be able to avoid bargaining with their citizens. Second, resource-withholding or withdrawal is an equilibrium strategy that convinces the government to bargain. Third, governments may bargain credibly even in the absence of formal constraints.

Crises and dislocations home in on social, economic, and political weaknesses that are often sidestepped or pushed to the backburner in the interests of master plans of growth or development. Recovery from crises, then, provides the opportunity to address these underlying issues that preceded and, likely, contributed to the crises or dislocation; meanwhile, a return to the previous normalcy following such crises generally means exacerbation of these weaknesses that erode and threaten to fracture social, economic and political foundations. This paper documents social and economic policies across two financial crises, the Asian Financial Crisis and the Global Financial Crisis, for South Korea, the Philippines, and Indonesia, to reveal the problems from growth-centric recovery focus on economic fragilities, social cohesion, and political stability. Further, using evidence from the ground and survey data, we also show how recovery to a new normal with a reprioritization of social policies invigorates the social, political, and economic foundations. We round off the study with an examination of social policy changes under COVID-19 to assess how the efforts track against a recovery to business-as-usual economic normalcy or a new normal that reprioritizes social policies and the economy. The scope of change is high; as we show in the paper, it is also necessary.

In nations where the executive has budgetary control, how are spending decisions and allocations affected? Is intraparty conflict relevant? This article sets out to show that institutional rules and leadership roles affect budgetary outcomes. It makes the following argument: if intraparty conflict exists in a one-party dominant or majority-party system, the executive reduces spending to punish the party in the legislature; if no intraparty conflict exists, then the executive increases spending to reward or cultivate loyalty to himself as the party leader. If intraparty conflict exists in a minority government or majority-coalition within a competitive multiparty system, the executive increases spending to reward or cultivate loyalty to himself as the party or coalition leader. Evidence from South Korea and Taiwan between the 1970s and 2000 supports the theory. This study advances scholarship in three ways. First, it shows that institutional rules that provide the executive with agenda control also lead to the strategic use of the budgetary process and outcomes to generate loyalty to the executive as leader. Second, it reveals that this strategy affects spending outcomes in election years; this is an important caveat to electoral spending manipulations. Third, the strategic use of the budget to control intraparty conflict occurred prior to and following democratization; this reveals that institutional changes need to include modifications in rules for policy transformations.