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The puzzle of the African Union mediation is that it enjoys regional effectiveness in leading peace processes and yet often fails to prevent atrocity crimes. While existing studies focus on the lack of capacity to explain failures, I draw on atrocity mediation literature that emphasizes coercive strategies for ripening to explore widely significant factors associated with the AU mediation. I adopt the “framework of mediator behavior” in international mediation studies to analyze AU policies on conflict responses and the mediation in South Sudan. My approach is consistent with the content analysis of qualitative data. I find that the significant factor in the AU mediation is the “patient” policy, like “strategic patience.” The policy reflects formulative strategy of conflict mediation that describes the mediator who controls the process but shifts control of substantive decision-making to the parties. Formulative strategy is technically non-coercive, so the AU embraces it to respect sovereignty. The paradox is that formulative strategy is the AU legitimacy source—which anchors effectiveness—and failure. The AU mediation failed because of strategic choice, not the lack of capabilities. This study contributes to a broader understanding of the AU mediation and challenges mediator behavior assumptions.

Ten years after its endorsement by the un General Assembly, the operationalisation of the Responsibility to Protect (RtoP) concept faces challenges of consistency and capacity.

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This article explains the role of coercion in international mediation of violent conflict involving atrocity crimes from the parties' perspectives. It draws on coercion theory and expands the framework of atrocity mediation, examining the successful yet controversial African Union mediation with the global community in Kenya. Coercion theory aims to solve what this study reads as the agent-coercion problem in the international system: agents retain choice despite coercion by more powerful actors. The framework argues that conflict parties are rational, legitimate voluntary agents who always have choices when considering the cost/benefit consequences of peace initiatives, comprising 1) consenting to mediation, 2) breaking stalemates, or 3) reaching compromises while being coerced. Thus, strategy requires mediators to create ripeness by incorporating enticing opportunities in mediation or settlement proposals, accommodating the disputants' core interests. Then coercion's role would be to build consensus on peace offers, persuading reluctant parties that compromise is the better choice than resistance. Importantly, coercion infuses a sense of urgency in the parties' contemplation of the cost/benefit implications of their choices, accelerating decision-making on resolving the proximate causes of violence that triggered atrocities. The study contributes to understanding better the limits of power mediation in international relations.