The emergence of politicians with overwhelming financial muscle in Nigeria since 1990s has complicated the relationship between money and politics in the country. This has been intensified by lack of clear legislation on how political parties should seek funding for their campaigns. Although effective supervision of political parties’ finance is critical to the survival and consolidation of any democracy, the relevant electoral laws in Nigeria have not been effectively enforced. This is evident in the unbridled deployment of financial and other material resources by moneyed politicians and corporations during party campaign fundraising and electioneering. Among other things, this paper investigated the interface between the electoral laws and monitoring of campaign financing during the 2015 Presidential Election in Nigeria. The study is a documentary research and data were analyzed using a qualitative descriptive method. Utilizing the Marxist theory of the post-colonial state, the paper established that the electoral laws are generally couched ambiguously by politicians with vested interests in order to weaken the enforcement capacity of the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC), as well as facilitate the advancement of the electoral interests of the ‘political entrepreneurs’. Thus, the unbundling of the Commission is recommended as a sine qua non for effective monitoring and supervision of political parties in the country.

The protracted armed conflict in Somalia has engendered an unprecedented humanitarian crisis; one that makes it a leading storehouse of the worst humanitarian conditions in the world. The intervention of the African Union (AU) through its third Peace Support Operation- the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)- was aimed at supporting the Transitional Federal Institutions in the stabilisation of the country, advancing dialogue and reconciliation as well as facilitating the provision of humanitarian support. The achievement of the humanitarian component of the mission’s mandate is largely contingent on the first two mandates. Essentially, this study interrogated the interface between the implementation of the humanitarian component of AMISOM mandate and the control of the worsening conditions of Somali internally displaced persons and refugees. Anchoring analysis within the classical approach to national security, the study found that the restoration of relative stability in the polity has not widened access to economic and humanitarian assistance in the terror-laden state of Somalia. Thus, greater commitment of major stakeholders, especially the United Nations (UN), the United States as well as the AU is required in the transmutation of AMISOM and Somalia National Armed Forces into a force that is entirely indigenous to the people of Somalia. This will serve as an elixir to the ever-constricting humanitarian corridor that has exacerbated the conditions of the victims of forced migration in Somalia.

Burkina Faso and Mali have been grappling with multiple security threats including jihadist challenge, military coup d’état, violent extremism, and poor governance. These complex security problems have escalated into national conflicts, state failure, internal displacements, and forced migration. This paper examined the changing patterns of the drivers and enablers of these security threats and how these forces feed into the protracted challenges of forced migration and population displacements. Using qualitative methods and documentary evidence, the paper found that poor governance, lack of state-building measures, and socio-economic exclusion of local populations contributed to the worsening crises of forced migration and population displacements in Burkina-Faso and Mali. The paper emphasised the human security perspectives hinged on good governance principles through effective leadership in Burkina-Faso and Mali particularly in the areas of industrialization, employment creation, reduction of poverty, and provision of adequate security for the people.

Agitations for political restructuring have come from virtually all age groups, socio-ethnic and political configurations in Nigeria. However, little or nothing is known about the ethnic and religious differences in the entire agitations especially among the youths. This study examined ethnic and religious differences in the knowledge and support for political restructuring among the youths in Nigeria. Participants were 575 youths (372 males, 180 females, M = 25.62, SD = 5.51) drawn from Nigeria's six geopolitical zones. Data were collected using questionnaires assessing knowledge and support for political restructuring. One-way ANOVA was used to analyze the data. Results showed that youths from minority ethnic groups reported higher knowledge and support for political restructuring. For the various religious groups, Muslims have more knowledge and support for political restructuring. Relying on the issue-specific motivator model, the study highlighted the implications of these findings for research and policy.

This article assessed security architecture for counter-insurgency against Boko Haram in the Lake Chad Basin (LCB). The paper diagnosed the impact of conflicting national interests of contributing nations on the performance of the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) as a regional security architecture in the LCB. Some scholars and analysts cite corruption, historical contradictions among LCB members, poor funding, and complex nature of the insurgency, as factors responsible for failure of counter-insurgency operations in the LCB. Others contend that resource geopolitics, linguistic differences, and hegemonic politics have impacted negatively on the capacity of the MNJTF to decimate terrorists in the region. This is a qualitative study that draws from the Fund for Peace, International Crisis Group (ICG), Lake Chad Basin Commission, the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data (ACLED), and research literature dealing with national interest and military alliances, while using content analysis to argue that conflicts in national interests, more than any other factor, have hampered the collaborative efforts of the Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC) and weakened the capacity of the MNJTF to engage in robust counterinsurgency against Boko Haram in the LCB.