Why did the country vote for Brexit? What was the relative importance of factors such as education, age, immigration, and ethnic diversity? And to what extent did the pattern of support for Brexit across the country map on to past campaigns by Eurosceptic parties, such as Ukip? In this article we draw on aggregate-level data to conduct an initial exploration of the vote. First, we find that turnout was generally higher in more pro-leave areas. Second, we find that public support for Leave closely mapped past support for Ukip. And third, we find that support for Leave was more polarized along education lines than support for Ukip ever was. The implication of this finding is that support for Euroscepticism has both widened and narrowed -it is now more widespread across the country, but it is also more socially distinctive.

The outcome of the 2019 general election—a resounding Conservative majority and an unprecedented defeat for Labour—delivered a decisive electoral verdict for the first time in recent years following a period where British politics has been characterised by instability and indecision. In this article, we draw on aggregate‐level data to conduct an initial exploration of the vote. What was the impact of Brexit on the 2019 general election result? How far has Brexit reshaped electoral politics? Was 2019 a ‘realignment election’? And, if so, what are the implications? With a focus on England and Wales we show that, although the Conservatives made gains deep into Labour’s working class heartlands, these gains have been a long time coming, reflected in Labour’s weakening relationship with working class Britain. As such, 2019 is not a critical election but a continuation of longer‐term trends of dealignment and realignment in British politics.

Why does the strength of class voting vary over time? Recent research has emphasized factors related to the structure of political choice at the party level. This article examines different aspects of this choice, and investigates whether voters are more likely to respond to the social or policy cues that parties send voters. The results from the British context suggest that the former are more important than the latter. The central implication of this finding is that social representation matters, and that the social background of political representatives influences how voters relate to political parties.The extent to which social divisions within society are expressed politically is a longestablished topic of controversy. Whereas most of the controversies over description and measurement have been resolved, many controversies over explanation remain. Why has class been such a major influence on voting behaviour in Britain? Why has the impact of class on vote declined over time? And more generally, why does its impact vary? What factors condition the political salience of social divisions? Answers to these questions have tended to fall into one of two camps: those that privilege social structural factors and those that emphasize political choice factors. The former -which dominated the early literature -tended to view political divisions as simple reflections of social conditions. This view is neatly summed up by Lazarsfeld et al., who famously wrote: 'A person thinks politically as he is socially'.1 According to this 'bottom-up' approach, changes that have occurred within the electorate over the last fifty years, such as rising living standards, the spread of affluence, social mobility and the emergence of new issues have undermined the salience of traditional group identities and made voters more individualistic.2 Accordingly, the salience of social divisions has declined over time, and this in turn has led to a decline in class voting, which -despite rising levels of inequality -apparently signifies 'the successful resolution by political systems of deep-seated conflicts of social interests'. 3The problems with this account have been well documented.4 First, on a theoretical level it is somewhat deterministic, and does not pay sufficient attention to how voters respond to the actions of political parties, or how parties themselves mobilize and appeal to different sections of society. Secondly, on an empirical level, these sociological accounts (which emphasize gradual processes of social change and individualization) fail to capture much real-world variation, and are unable to account for instances when the * Department of Politics and International Relations, Royal Holloway, University of London (email: Oliver.Heath@rhul.ac.uk). I would like to thank Heinrich Best, Rosie Campbell, Byron Criddle, Geoffrey Evans, Stefan Jahr, Pippa Norris, the editor and the reviewers for their help, comments and constructive feedback. Online appendices are available at http://dx.doi.org/doi: 10.1017/S0007123413000318.1 Laza...

This article presents an examination of class-based inequalities in turnout at British elections. These inequalities have substantially grown, and the class divide in participation has become greater than the class divide in vote choice between the two main parties. To account for class inequalities in turnout three main hypotheses -to do with policy indifference, policy alienation and social alienation -are tested. The results from the British context suggest that the social background of political representatives influences the ways in which voters participate in the political process, and that the decline in proportion of elected representatives from working-class backgrounds is strongly associated with the rise of working-class abstention.

The outcome of the 2017 general election—a hung parliament—defied most predictions. In this article, we draw on aggregate‐level data to conduct an initial exploration of the vote. What was the impact of Brexit on the 2017 general election result? What difference did the collapse of UKIP make? And what was the relative importance of factors such as turnout, education, age and ethnic diversity on support for the two main parties? First, we find that turnout was generally higher in more pro‐remain areas, and places with high concentrations of young people, ethnic minorities and university graduates. Second, we find that the Conservatives made gains in the sort of places that had previously backed Brexit and previously voted for UKIP. But, third, we find that the gains the Conservatives made from the electoral decline of UKIP were offset by losses in the sort of places that had previously supported the Conservatives, particularly areas in southern England with larger numbers of graduates. The implication of these findings is that while a Brexit effect contributed to a ‘realignment on the right’, with the Conservative strategy appealing to people in places that had previously voted for UKIP, this strategy was not without an electoral cost, and appears to have hurt the party in more middle class areas.