РезюмеСША на протяжении длительного времени отстаивают привилегированную роль в вопросах кон-троля за соблюдением норм международного права, в том числе в отношении использования и эксплуатации пространств и ресурсов Мирового океана. Борьба с необоснованными, по их мне-нию, претензиями других государств осуществляется в рамках программы «Свобода мореплава-ния» (Freedom of Navigation -FON). Её реализация играет важнейшую роль не только в обеспе-чении торговых и экономических интересов США, но и с точки зрения возможности оператив-ной переброски американских вооруженных сил морским путем. При этом в области борьбы с такими видами угроз, как распространение ядерного оружия, пиратство, морской терроризм, представляющими опасность для всего международнноого сообщества, США не исключают для себя возможность нарушения норм Конвенции ООН по морскому праву 1982 года. Стремление обеспечить себе приоритетные права в области осуществления военно-морской и разведывательной деятельности ведет к расширительному толкованию Вашингтоном отдельных конвенционных норм и интерпретации их как норм обычного права. Неучастие Соединенных Штатов в Конвенции 1982 года, с одной стороны, в сочетании с последовательной практикой принуждения к исполнению конвенционных норм другими странами -с другой, свидетельству-ют о глобальной противоречивости океанической политики США. В настоящее время формиру-ются дополнительные экономические и политические стимулы, побуждающие Вашингтон пере-смотреть свою политику в отношении основополагающего международного документа по мор-скому праву. Вместе с тем перспективы его присоединения к Конвенции 1982 г. и, в более широ-ком смысле, корректировки подходов к вопросам регулирования пространств Мирового океана будет зависеть от расстановки внутриполитических сил, отстаивающих различные варианты международной стратегии. Ключевые слова:Мировой океан; Конвенция ООН по морскому праву 1982 года; свобода судоходства; право тран-зитного прохода; международные проливы; военно-морские силы; ОМУ; ИБОР; морской терро-ризм; нормы договорного и обычного права; Арктика; АТР. ПОЛИТИКА США В МИРОВОМ ОКЕАНЕ ПАВЕЛ ГУДЕВИнститут мировой экономики и международных отношений РАН им. Е.М. Примакова, Москва, Россия

The Eastern Mediterranean is becoming a new region of interstate confrontation and clash of national interests. This is largely due to the discovery of oil and gas reserves, the development of which is becoming possible with the existing technology. The Republic of Turkey has a special position regarding this maritime region. The paper analyzes those bases - historical, political and legal - that determine Turkeys current policy with regard to maritime delimitation and the settlement of maritime disputes in the Eastern Mediterranean. Particularly, it is shown that Turkeys policy in the region continues to be based on the approaches that were announced by Turkey during the I-III UN Conferences on the Law of the Sea (1958, 1960, 1973-1982 respectively), which have remained unchanged up to now. This position, as regards both the outer limits of the territorial sea, the legal regime of islands and the delimitation of the continental shelf, continues to define the essence of the controversy between Turkey and other countries of the region, including Greece and the Republic of Cyprus. At the same time, it is shown that there is a set of circumstances that significantly limit the prospects of solving these interstate contradictions within the framework of international judicial instances, including the International Court of Justice and the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea. The conclusion is made that, for both Turkey and Greece, the most acceptable option would be to work out a model of settlement, which would not imply the obligation of its immediate implementation. Particular attention is paid to the ideological and practical framing of Turkish claims within the framework of the Blue Homeland doctrine, developed by a number of retired Turkish officers. It shows how Ankara uses the ideas of pan-Turkism and neo-Ottomanism to justify its claims to vast maritime spaces. The distinctive feature of this doctrine most likely is its anti-American, anti-NATO and anti-European orientation. There is a paradoxical situation when certain ideas enshrined in this concept directly correlate with the interests of the Russian Federation.

The Eastern Mediterranean has become an arena of fierce competition for an access to sea spaces and their resources, including hydrocarbons. Coastal states and a number of non-regional players are deeply involved in this rivalry. Currently the region is witnessing a confrontation between Turkey and a "balancing coalition", which consists of Greece, Cyprus, Israel and Egypt. The article deals with the problem of maritime spaces delimitation in the Aegean Sea and the Eastern Mediterranean. It also studies the policies of the main actors. The primary goal is to make an assessment of the risks and to analyze possible ways to reduce tension by balancing the interests of major players. The analysis shows that Turkey intends to consistently defend its claims on the continental shelf based on the so-called "principle of justice", thus challenging the Greek claims. Ankara managed to prevent the construction of the EastMed gas pipeline, thus hurting the interests of other countries of the region. In turn, Greece appeals to the norms of international maritime law. Itis actively looking now for allies that could help it contain Turkey. There is a potential “anti-Turkey” coalition comprising France, Israel and Egypt. The authors conclude that, despite the extreme complexity of the situation, especially from the legal point of view, tension in the Eastern Mediterranean can be reduced because the countries of the region are reluctant to engage in a military confrontation with Turkey and alternative routes for energy transportation exist. In addition, there are signs that Greece might be open to a reasonable compromise with Turkey.

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The conclusion of the Convention on the Legal Status of the Caspian Sea in 2018 was intended to put an end to a very long and difficult negotiation process to determine the legal regime for this closed water body, which has no natural connection with the World Ocean. The Convention was supposed to fill the gaps in the management of this water area that existed in the framework of the previous Soviet-Iranian agreements of 1921 and 1940, which were in force but not up to date, and to give all the Caspian states common and equal rights and powers to use and exploit the spaces and resources of this maritime region. However, up to 2022, the Convention has not entered into legal force, as one of the Caspian countries — the Islamic Republic of Iran — has not yet ratified this regional agreement, considering that it is the most disadvantaged party. Despite the resolution of the Caspian Sea seabed delimitation issues in its northern part in previous years, the problem of delimitation in its southern part may require both enormous efforts and time, further complicating the current situation. There is as yet no final understanding as to what delimitation models can be used here to satisfy the interests of all the states involved. Moreover, the implementation of the norms and provisions of the 2018 Convention requires the drafting and signing of new bilateral and multilateral documents that close a whole series of “gaps” in the proposed convention regime. In fact, the fate of the 2018 Convention depends on how these contradictions will be resolved. The analysis of these problems is the focus of this paper.