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Often companies in the (petro-) chemical industry claim that all possible countermeasures against potential accidents have been taken and therefore accidents are unforeseeable. In this paper we question this statement by analysing the pre-warning signals (precursors) preceding a number of industrial accidents. 17 accidents that occurred in the (petro-) chemical industry have been investigated by exploring FACTS, an accident database containing information about industrial accidents worldwide. This paper will demonstrate that the existence of precursor information could have been used to foresee and even prevent these accidents if a proper control action had been initiated. The accidents are analysed further, according to a control model, which was adapted from that of C. Argyris. It demonstrates the ineffectiveness of several elements of business process control loops and that the so-called 'double-loop learning' cycle is more important than the 'single-loop learning' cycle if one considers safety improvement.

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A major non-trivial problem within the area of industrial safety management today is to analyse, next to the safety impact of the technical equipment, the safety impact of a 'business process' as currently required by regulation and safety standards. This paper describes a case study of a pesticide company struggling with the question of how to improve the safety of their operational process further and at the same time also improve the reliability of their operational process. According to the literature 'control of the business process' is the keyword to improve the safety and reliability 'performance' of a company. A formal control model is proposed together with a classification system (using maturity levels) to analyse and qualify business processes with respect to their impact on process safety. This method has been applied in a case study where it resulted in a model of a business process. Using the model it was possible to classify the business process control system used and to identify related improvement opportunities. The proposed method showed that, in contrast to the company's perception, it was not the production department that was responsible for most of the problems but the peripheral processes relating to the production department. The interaction between departments caused not only potential safety problems, but also caused system reliability problems. For the company it was demonstrated that the interdependency of the (different activities in the-) operational process is an essential element preventing further improvement if not addressed properly.