Currently, many businesses in the consumer electronics industry are facing an increasing number of consumer complaints, despite the application of quality tools that proved to be very powerful in the past. We assessed over 20 new product development projects, to understand the reasons behind the rising number of consumer complaints. We found that businesses are developing more innovative products that are brought to the market faster, with inherently higher uncertainties on the consumer expectations of these products. Current analyses of consumer complaints solely focus on checking if the product is functioning according to the technical specification, and these analyses show a rising number of consumer complaints where no failure could be established. When looking at product quality and reliability from a consumer's perspective, we found that consumers complain not only about technical product failures but also when the product does not satisfy their expectations. In this paper we will take the perspective of the consumer to analyse dissatisfaction with new products from various available sources, which were not set-up for quality and reliability purposes. We will show that analysing information from these sources gives better information, especially on the non-technical failures compared with the traditional quality and reliability sources.

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Often companies in the (petro-) chemical industry claim that all possible countermeasures against potential accidents have been taken and therefore accidents are unforeseeable. In this paper we question this statement by analysing the pre-warning signals (precursors) preceding a number of industrial accidents. 17 accidents that occurred in the (petro-) chemical industry have been investigated by exploring FACTS, an accident database containing information about industrial accidents worldwide. This paper will demonstrate that the existence of precursor information could have been used to foresee and even prevent these accidents if a proper control action had been initiated. The accidents are analysed further, according to a control model, which was adapted from that of C. Argyris. It demonstrates the ineffectiveness of several elements of business process control loops and that the so-called 'double-loop learning' cycle is more important than the 'single-loop learning' cycle if one considers safety improvement.