The phenomena of euroscepticism in France is analyzed in the paper. The participation of France in key projects of the European construction is examined. The models combining supranational initiatives with French national interests are described in this context. Main differences between federalist project of J. Monnet and R. Schumann and confederalist plans of Ch. de Gaulle and F. Mitterrand. The positions of French eurosceptical parties and movements and second half of XX century are researched. The particularities of evolution for leftish eurosceptics are analyzed in the cases of the French Communist party, Trotskyist forces, left souverenists and antiliberal left of J-L. Mélenchon. The specifics of development for right-side eurosceptics is outlined by the examples of Gaullist parties, right neogaullist souverenists, ultra-right conservative and antiglobalist forces including the National Front. Common and different features in the agendas of leftish and right-wing eurosceptics are shown, the referendum agenda of 2005 is among them. Contemporary trends in the development of French eurosceptics, their positions and social base in the presidential elections of 2017 are examined. The author concludes that despite the rising of leftish and right-wing eurosceptics, electoral alliances between them could be just tactical. The promotion of common candidate by both leftish and right-wing eurosceptics seems to be unrealistic in the near future-as well as the French "exit" from EU. Nevertheless eurosceptics-the ones who reflect protest sentiments-will keep influencing the French society: they will force the establishment reacting to urgent issues promoted by eurosceptic agenda.

The study is focused on the COVID 19 pandemic as a challenge for Franco-German leadership in the European Union. The authors investigate whether joint actions by Berlin and Paris can strengthen the EU’s resilience to crises. As it is shown, the first isolationist reaction of the EU states to pandemic was followed by their attempts to find a common decision. The negotiations on an anti-crisis plan were complicated by the division of the European Union states into opposing camps. Two projects proposed by them – the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) and the “coronabonds” – reflected the narrow interests of rich, frugal “Northern” and economically modest “Southern” groups, and failed. In contrast, the Franco-German cooperation became a breakthrough. In March-April 2020, Germany and France opposed each other, supporting ESM and coronabonds, respectfully. In May-June 2020, A. Merkel and E. Macron agreed to a compromise and came up with a unified position. While Germany left “frugal” group by agreeing to allocate money to support the “South” without insisting on mandatory reforms, and endorsed the idea of joint debt obligations, France refused to support the “Southern” coronabond project and agreed to the mediation of the EU Commission. That gave new breath to negotiations where a new regrouping of countries took place: the “South” states failing to defend coronabonds supported the Franco-German plan based on subsidies, while the “frugals” put forward an alternative based on loans. The EU Commission’s project which included both proposals was discussed in July 2020: at that moment, the Franco-German tandem backed by the “South” states had to persuade both the “frugal” and the East- European states. Finally, the EU Commission’s plan promoted by Merkel and Macron was adopted, though with serious adjustments. The authors conclude that the Franco-German alliance has confirmed its capability to strengthen the European Union resilience, but its leadership is no longer unconditional, and in the future, they should take into account the interests of the EU regional groups. Acknowledgments. The article was prepared within the project “Post-Crisis World Order: Challenges and Technologies, Competition and Cooperation” supported by the grant from Ministry of Science and Higher Education of the Russian Federation program for research projects in priority areas of scientific and technological development (Agreement № 075-15-2020-783).

Статья выполнена в рамках проекта РФФИ № 18-011-00464 "Меняющаяся роль Германии в евроинтеграционных и трансатлантических процессах. Вызовы для России".

The article presents a comparative analysis of Germany and France’s approaches towards Russia. The authors compared the place of Russia in the official narrative and program documents of Germany and France as well as their positions on the useful practical mechanisms for developing a dialogue with Russia, on main political (Ukraine crisis) and political-economic issues (Nord Stream-2, negotiations on the Sputnik vaccine) in Russia-EU relations. The authors conclude that conceptual solidarity and agreement on political issues do not prevent Germany and France from disagreeing on some economically sensitive issues of relationships with Russia.

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