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The study is focused on the COVID 19 pandemic as a challenge for Franco-German leadership in the European Union. The authors investigate whether joint actions by Berlin and Paris can strengthen the EU’s resilience to crises. As it is shown, the first isolationist reaction of the EU states to pandemic was followed by their attempts to find a common decision. The negotiations on an anti-crisis plan were complicated by the division of the European Union states into opposing camps. Two projects proposed by them – the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) and the “coronabonds” – reflected the narrow interests of rich, frugal “Northern” and economically modest “Southern” groups, and failed. In contrast, the Franco-German cooperation became a breakthrough. In March-April 2020, Germany and France opposed each other, supporting ESM and coronabonds, respectfully. In May-June 2020, A. Merkel and E. Macron agreed to a compromise and came up with a unified position. While Germany left “frugal” group by agreeing to allocate money to support the “South” without insisting on mandatory reforms, and endorsed the idea of joint debt obligations, France refused to support the “Southern” coronabond project and agreed to the mediation of the EU Commission. That gave new breath to negotiations where a new regrouping of countries took place: the “South” states failing to defend coronabonds supported the Franco-German plan based on subsidies, while the “frugals” put forward an alternative based on loans. The EU Commission’s project which included both proposals was discussed in July 2020: at that moment, the Franco-German tandem backed by the “South” states had to persuade both the “frugal” and the East- European states. Finally, the EU Commission’s plan promoted by Merkel and Macron was adopted, though with serious adjustments. The authors conclude that the Franco-German alliance has confirmed its capability to strengthen the European Union resilience, but its leadership is no longer unconditional, and in the future, they should take into account the interests of the EU regional groups. Acknowledgments. The article was prepared within the project “Post-Crisis World Order: Challenges and Technologies, Competition and Cooperation” supported by the grant from Ministry of Science and Higher Education of the Russian Federation program for research projects in priority areas of scientific and technological development (Agreement № 075-15-2020-783).

The article is devoted to the role of Franco-German tandem in the development of the European defense by 2020, including EU PESCO projects as well as bilateral initiatives outside of PESCO framework. The study uses an innovative approach applying the methods of statistical and cluster analysis to the three waves of PESCO projects. It enables to identify the contribution and the level of cooperation of the Franco-German tandem in the PESCO implementation process. It is demonstrated that besides France and Germany, EU Mediterranean states are also leading in terms of the number of projects so it would be more exact to talk about the central role of the European “big four” (France, Italy, Spain, Germany) as an engine of PESCO process. At the same time, France and Germany actively develop two ambitious bilateral projects outside of the PESCO framework – these are Future Combat Air System (FCAS) and Main Group Combat System (MGCS), the models of innovative fighter jet and tank, based on the “system of systems” principle. These projects demonstrate the two countries’ ambitious plans, although it is too early to evaluate the results since the projects are to be implemented by the mid-2030s. Nevertheless, several factors complicating the military cooperation of the two sides are identified. Those include the lack of a common approach towards conceptual issues causing the development of new weapons; the absence of a joint view on the participation of third states in French-German projects outside of PESCO (only Spain is accepted to work on FCAS, no third state is allowed to participate in MGCS construction); the competition between French and German manufacturing companies regarding the projects’ leadership and the two countries’ different export policies. Although the idea of the EU strategic autonomy promoted by the Franco-German tandem has been actively developing since 2017, today these two countries do not determine the PESCO process and do not agree on all the issues. Thus France and Germany still have a significant amount of work to do in this area.

Статья подготовлена в рамках проекта РФФИ № 18-011-00464А "Меняющаяся роль Германии в евроинтеграционных и трансатлантических процессах. Вызовы для России". Хорольская М.В. Новое во внешнеполитических ориентирах ведущих партий ФРГ.

The article is devoted to changes in the party-political system of Germany. Elections to the Bundestag are to be held in Germany on September 26. After 16 years of the leadership, Angela Merkel will not run for chancellor. Currently, the main German political parties face challenges. Major parties lose electoral support. The emergence of a new party, the “Alternative for Germany”, split votes, and makes it difficult to form a coalition. Parties should also overcome internal split and find their identity in a changing world. An analysis of the electoral programmes revealed that German political parties seek to return to traditional identity. CDU/CSU moves to the right, seeking to win back the AfG supporters. SPD and FDP in their electoral documents also appeal to their traditional electorate. The AfG’s nomination of lead candidates supported by the right wing of the party also indicates that the “Alternative for Germany” will move towards radical right-wing positions. The Left Party comes out with radical leftist demands, which limits the possibility of its entry into the coalition. The most successful is the Green Party’s electoral strategy. Party leaders abandoned radical demands of their predecessors. Greens advocate a citizen-supported climate program, but pay attention to the economic viability of reforms. According to polls, the black-green coalition (CDU/CSU and Union 90/Greens) seems the most likely. However, in the course of coalition negotiations, the parties may face difficulties in finding a compromise on tax policy and environmental reforms. At the same time, the parties have no significant contradictions on the foreign policy agenda (with the exception of a number of specific issues). Acknowledgments. The article was prepared within the project “Post-Crisis World Order: Challenges and Technologies, Competition and Cooperation” supported by the grant from Ministry of science and higher education of the Russian Federation program for research projects in priority areas of scientific and technological development (Agreement № 075-15-2020-783).