RESUMEN: Según las reglas del código civil la jurisprudencia no es fuente del Derecho en Chile. Sin embargo, diversas reformas procesales -en materia penal, laboral y a futuro civil-restringen el recurso ante la Corte Suprema a resolver solo aquellos casos de jurisprudencia contradictoria. ¿Este tipo de cambios procesales signifi can que Chile pasará a tener un sistema de precedentes vinculantes similar al common law? Este artículo estudia cómo los precedentes afectan, en mayor o menor grado, las prácticas interpretativas en distintos países. Y, a partir de esa perspectiva comparada, analiza en qué situación se encuentra Chile actualmente y en cuál terminaría de seguir con este tipo de reformas procesales. Se concluye que es necesario el reemplazo de la teoría binaria tradicional sobre fuentes del Derecho por otra que admita en grados y escalas, como la propuesta de MacCormick y Summers. Palabras clave: Precedente vinculante, Reforma procesal civil, Fuentes del Derecho.ABSTRACT: According to the rules of the civil code, case-law is not a source of Law in Chile. However, different procedural reforms -in criminal, labor and civil matters in the future-restricts the recourse before the Supreme Court to solve only those cases of contradictory case-law. Does this kind of procedural changes mean that Chile would pass through a system of binding precedents like the common law? This article studies how precedents affects, in a great or less degree, the interpretative practice in different countries. On that comparative perspective, analyzes in which situation is Chile nowadays and in witch will be if it follows this kind of procedural reforms. It concludes that is necessary the replacement of the traditional binary theory about sources of Law, for another that allows degrees and scales,

While civil law courts of last resort—e.g., cassation courts in France, Italy, and Chile—review up to 90% of appealed cases, common law courts of last resort—e.g., supreme courts of the United States, United Kingdom, and Canada—hear as few as 1% of the same petitions. In this study, we postulate that these different policies can be explained by a comparatively larger commitment from common law courts of last resort to judicial law-making rather than judicial uniformity. While courts require few hearings to update the law (in theory one decision is sufficient), they need a large number of hearings to maximize consistency in the lower courts’ interpretation of the law. We show that the optimal number of hearings increases with an increment in the courts’ concern for uniformity. We also show that if hearing costs are linear then the hearing policies of all courts can be classified in only two types. In addition, we predict important changes in hearing policies when the number of petitions increases. Finally, we find that hearing rates and reversal disutility operate as two ways in which a legal system can achieve a given level of judicial uniformity.

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Fondecyt regular Nº 1170067: "El principio de la buena fe procesal. Análisis dogmático y crítico de su rol como fuente de cargas, deberes y sanciones en la formación del debate", investigador principal prof. Dr. JORGE LARROUCAU TORRES.

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