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This article examines the opinions of Catholic and Lutheran authors on the question of whether a judge should decide a case according to his personal knowledge when that knowledge conflicts with the charges and evidence at the trial. The majority of the Catholics contended that the judge had to follow the evidence. They distinguished between the judge as a public functionary and as a private man. The judge could not use in a trial what he knew as a man. There were certain Lutherans whose opinions remained close to this position. However, a significant number argued that the distinction between the judge as a functionary and as a man lacked foundation. Divine law commanded the judge to avoid lies and not to kill an innocent. If the judge knew that someone was innocent and nonetheless condemned him by following the evidence at the trial, he committed a sin. To avoid giving an unjust sentence, the judge had to use the knowledge he had obtained privately.

Due to its enormous importance, Grotius’s contract doctrine has been extensively investigated by legal historians. This paper seeks to enhance scholarly understanding of this topic by looking at commentaries on De jure belli ac pacis written by German theologians and jurists in the second half of the seventeenth century. The paper focuses on comments concerning promises: the criteria for promises that are binding under natural law; the foundations of the obligation to keep promises; error and duress; and immoral promises. Grotius’s contract doctrine rested on a mélange of sources, both theological and juridical, which were not always consistent. Commentators sought to harmonise them by looking at them from different perspectives: some comments were mainly based on interpretations of ius commune texts, whereas others reflected a moral theological approach. The results drew distinctions (directly or indirectly) between law and moral theology that contributed to the fragmentation of Grotius’s synthesis.

This article examines the relationship between the magistrate and his subjects as developed in the Tractatus de regimine seculari et ecclesiastico (1619) by the German jurist Dietrich Reinking (1590–1664). The Tractatus represents the magistrate-subject relationship by reference to the adjectives publicus and privatus. We argue that these adjectives carry particular weight within the context of Reinking’s political theory that bases itself upon the Lutheran doctrine of the two kingdoms. Publicus is associated with a figure of authority that has been divinely ordained and governs the world, while privatus refers to the inferior subjects, who must obey the political authorities, even when these authorities act unjustly. This obedience has limits, however. If the magistratus issues a precept that contradicts divine and natural law, private subjects are entitled to disobey. Indeed, subjects, who participate in public administration, may actively resist, if the magistrate violates the fundamental laws of the empire. Such violations amounts to committing a sin against the divine authority that has ordained the officium of the magistrate, and which defines him as something more than a private man. Thus, the adjectives publicus and privatus belong to the worldly kingdom, where personae privatae are governed by personae publicae: this governance is parcelled into different officia that govern the res publica and are constrained by divine and natural law. In the spiritual kingdom, this distinction between private and public collapses, and individuals are placed on the same level vis-à-vis Christ, who is the sole persona publica.