The nature of food risk in Japan has undergone a qualitative change in recent years. This article synthesises insights from psychology, economics, and political science into an interdisciplinary risk approach to show how international relations impact consumer decisions in Japan by outlining how food risks are constructed and framed within existing narrative frameworks. To this end, the article employs two case studies: the gyoza incident in 2008, when poisoned dumplings imported from China caused ten people to fall ill, and contaminated beef incident in 2011, in which five people died and dozens more were hospitalised after consuming raw beef tainted due to industrial negligence. These cases are analysed in the context of Japan's low rate of food self-sufficiency, deteriorating Sino-Japanese relations and the 'China threat theory', and perceptions of food safety. The article shows how, despite suffering recent major domestic food contamination incidents and lethal domestic food terrorism, Japanese food is perceived as safe and healthy whereas imported food, and especially Chinese food, is perceived as dangerous and unhealthy. This is exemplified in the domestic response to the two cases: the gyoza incident led to a national outcry, mass hysteria, and calls for a ban on Chinese food imports. Conversely, the raw beef contamination incident À the deadliest case of food contamination in Japan since the 1990s À saw a far more mixed response, as industry, media, and consumers called for the government to allow individuals to take on self-responsibility to mediate their own risks regarding (domestically produced Japanese) food. The article concludes by pointing out that, while behavioural sciences can tell us important things about risk, the political and international context must also be considered.

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Governed directly by the US from the Battle of Okinawa in 1945 until its reversion to Japan in 1972, the island of Okinawa hosts the majority of US military bases in Japan despite comprising only a fraction of a percent of the total land area. The central government in Tokyo has refused to countenance revision of the status quo in the face of increasing local opposition, including mass protests and the election of anti-base politicians at the local, prefectural and national level. The relocation of the controversial Marine base at Futenma to Henoko in the north of the island, has become the locus of opposition in recent years. Activists, local media and local politicians call for it to be relocated outside Okinawa to reduce the burden on the prefecture, while the central government, conservative national media and the US maintain that the current relocation plan must be implemented – to do otherwise would undermine deterrence. This article analyses the projection of the deterrence strategic narrative in the conservative Japanese media. The first section locates the concept of strategic narratives in a discursive epistemology, and highlights the importance of discursively empowered actors, before placing the newspapers in the broader context of the Japanese media environment, which differs from that of other highly developed countries in the way it empowers traditional actors. The main section of the article then traces the development of the narrative from the late 1990s, analysing how it discursively links the Marines’ presence with the ‘China threat’, and how it renders those who question the narrative as naïve, or even dangerous, for potentially undermining the Japan–US alliance and thus the security of all Japan. The article concludes by assessing the effects of the narrative, including potential unintended consequences for deterrence in the long run.

Despite frequent talk of conflict and even war, economic and strategic factors suggest that the Sino–Japanese dispute over the East China Sea will not erupt into hot conflict, at least for the time being. However, for domestic reasons, overt cooperation remains a distant prospect.

President Donald Trump's "America First" policy questions the fundamentals of the global U.S.-led alliance network. Where other allies implemented hedging strategies, Japan's Prime Minister Abe Shinzō pledged to "make the alliance even greater," insisting that the bilateral ties were "airtight" and "stronger than ever before." However, Trump's approach to trade, détente with North Korea, and off-the-cuff remarks regarding nuclear weapons invigorated criticism in Japan: the U.S. is an unreliable partner and Japan needs to prepare for life after the alliance. We argue that Abe's embrace of Trump was successful in staving off the worst, maintaining stability at the cost of personal humiliation and certain trade and security interests. However, Trump's cavalier treatment of Japan has laid bare the realities of the alliance, potentially revitalizing a more autonomous discourse of alternatives to the current and often "humiliating" modus in alliance management. Alliance Adrift Redux? Donald J. Trump's 2016 electoral victory has become known in Japan as the "Trump Shock," 1 echoing the "Nixon shocks" of the early 1970s. Like Nixon before him, Trump has departed from the status quo on security and trade policy, pressuring Japan on market access and burden-sharing while making unilateral and dramatic shifts in U.S. policy toward regional rivals (for Nixon it was China, for Trump it is North Korea). But where Nixon's foreign policy was amorally realist, Trump's has proved more narcissistic nativist. 2 Since his 2016 presidential campaign, Trump's "America First" policy has threatened to unravel the fundamentals of the global U.S.-led alliance networks in Europe and Asia. 3 Where other allies responded with hedging strategies, Japan's Prime Minister Abe Shinzō pledged to "make the alliance even greater," 4 cultivating close personal ties to Trump and insisting that the bilateral relationship was "airtight" 5 and "stronger than ever before." 6 Some pundits have argued that the "Trump Shock" even represents a golden opportunity for Japan to step up and pursue leadership in securing the stability of the international liberal order. 7 This embrace of Trump, and the ensuing so-called "bromance" between the two leaders, has been lauded by both Japanese and Western commentators and analysts. 8 However, it is far from clear what results Abe's approach has yielded. Trump's withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) agreement and tough approach to trade negotiations, sudden détente with North Korea, and off-the-cuff remarks regarding the prospect of Japan developing nuclear weapons have invigorated a sense of uncertainty among Japan's alliance managers, raising concerns as to whether the United States is a reliable partner and whether it is time for Japan to prepare for life after the U.S. alliance. 9 Thus, 4 years after Trump's election victory, and with the United States facing another divisive presidential election, in this article we take stock of Abe's response to the "Trump Shock" and assess the state of the alliance a...