This paper examines to what extent the background presence of state regulatory capacity -at times referred to as the "regulatory gorilla in the closet" -is a necessary precondition for the effective enforcement of transnational private regulation. By drawing on regulatory regimes in the areas of advertising and food safety, it identifies conditions under which (the potential of) public regulatory intervention can bolster the capacity of private actors to enforce transnational private regulation. These involve the overlap between norms, objectives, and interests of public and private regulation; the institutional design of regulatory enforcement; compliance with due process standards; and information management and data sharing. The paper argues that while public intervention remains important for the effective enforcement of transnational private regulation, governmental actors -both national and international -should create the necessary preconditions to strengthen private regulatory enforcement, as it can also enhance their own regulatory capacity, in particular, in transnational contexts.

In this article, we discuss the value of the RIT model for analyzing complex governance relationships in the regulation of food safety. By exploring food safety regimes involving the European Union and the Global Food Safety Initiative, we highlight the diverse and complex relationships between the actors in public, private, and hybrid regimes of food safety regulation. We extend the basic RIT model to better fit the reality of (hybrid) governance relationships in the modern regulation of food safety, arguing that the model enables disaggregation of these regimes into analytical subunits or “regulatory chains,” in which each actor contributes to and affects the regulatory process. Finally, we critically assess what the RIT model adds to alternative theoretical approaches in identifying, mapping, and explaining the different roles that actors play vis-à-vis others in regulatory regimes.

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Food safety regulation is a key policy area that has witnessed an increasing alignment of risk and regulation. This paper examines the emergence and operation of co-regulation - a hybrid form of regulation in which public and private actors coordinate their respective regulatory activities - within the increasingly risk-based approaches to food safety management. On the basis of an analysis of emerging co-regulatory arrangements to food safety in the European Union, the paper contends that there are considerable difficulties in implementing such hybrid arrangements and deepens the basic preconditions under which they can attain the social goal of safe food supply. Specifically, it is argued that a regulatory framework that fosters public oversight and warrants data sharing and information exchange between the public and private actors involved is needed for the attainment of that goal. This framework has to be responsive to changing risk profiles and industry environments to ensure that food safety controls are risk-based, transparent and not captured by industry interests. This is particularly crucial for encouraging voluntary compliance as well as efficient allocation of limited regulatory resources

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