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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Abstract. This paper develops a model for multi-store competition between firms. Using the fact that different firms have different outlets and produce horizontally differentiated goods, we obtain a pure strategy equilibrium where firms choose a different location for each outlet and firms' locations are interlaced. The location decisions of multi-store firms are completely independent of each other. Firms choose locations that minimize transportation costs of consumers. Moreover, generically, the subgame perfect equilibrium is unique and when the firms have an equal number of outlets, prices are independent of the number of outlets. Terms of use: Documents in

Research summary:We reconsider the relationship between multimarket contact and product quality in the airline industry by arguing that multimarket contact has both a negative mutual forbearance effect on quality and a positive network coordination effect on quality. Multimarket contact increases the frequency of contact between firms, and this anticipated future interaction promotes cooperation. In network industries, especially small firms may want to cooperate in order to increase the attractiveness of the composite product. By using size as a moderating variable, we indeed find a consistent positive effect of multimarket contact on product quality for small airlines. We show that this effect can be attributed to network coordination and that this effect generally dominates the negative mutual forbearance effect in a recent period.Managerial summary: Firms with sales in multiple geographical markets likely encounter each other with mutual respect (i.e., live and let live) because aggressive behavior in one market may lead to retaliatory responses in other markets. Such responses weaken competitive pressures on price and quality. Insofar these firms sell complementary products, they may however also coordinate and improve their joint product offering, resulting in better quality for the consumer. This paper shows that this positive effect of cooperation may dominate the negative competition-reducing effect, depending on the size distribution of firms. The reason is that small or nondominant firms have a stronger incentive to produce compatible products than large or dominant firms with already a strong position in the (global) market.

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