This article aims to broaden the theoretical foundations of the two-level games approach to understanding international negotiations by considering the conditions under which public opinion can act as a domestic constraint on the ability of international negotiators to reach agreement. In determining the role that public opinion plays, three factors are of central importance: (1) the preferences of the public relative to those of decision makers and other domestic constituents; (2) the intensity of the issue under negotiation; and (3) the power of the public to ratify a potential agreement. Evidence from the last decade of Anglo-Irish negotiations over the future and status of Northern Ireland shows that public opinion acts as a constraint on negotiators when the public has the power to directly ratify an international agreement. When the public's power to ratify an agreement is indirect, the intensity of the issue under negotiation will play a critical role in determining whether public preferences serve as a constraint on decision makers.One of the most compelling aspects of the two-level games approach is that it not only serves to explain the dynamics involved in international negotiations, it also challenges the realist paradigm which treats states as unitary rational actors, a perspective that continues to loom large in the international relations discipline. Instead, the two-level games approach provides an alternative way of thinking about the factors that influence the way nations interact. Two-level games analysis provides a framework by which we can observe and assess the impact of domestic preferences and institutions on international politics.A principal criticism of the two-level games approach in general, however, is that the two-level game as currently described is more a metaphor than a full-fledged theory. Moravcsik writes that for this approach to move from metaphor to theory, three essential theoretical building blocks are needed: "specifications of domestic politics (the nature of the 'win-sets'), of the international negotiating environment (the determinants of interstate bargaining outcomes), and the statesman's preferences"International Studies Quarterly (1998) 42, 545-565

It has been shown in the work of Ted Gurr and others that ethnic discrimination can lead to ethno-political rebellion, and that rebellion often leads to interstate conflict. The authors seek to discover whether rebellion is the only meaningful link between ethnic discrimination and international violence. Many scholars have argued that a domestic environment of inequality and violence results in a greater likelihood of state use of violence internationally. This argument is most fully developed within feminist literature; however, research in the area of ethno-political conflict has also highlighted the negative impact of domestic discrimination on state behavior at the international level. The analysis builds upon the literature linking domestic gender inequality and state aggression to other inequalities created and/or sustained by the state. Using the Minorities at Risk (MAR) and Militarized Interstate Disputes (MID) datasets, the authors test whether states characterized by higher levels of discrimination against ethnic minorities are more likely to exhibit higher levels of hostility or to use force first when involved in international disputes. Group-level data in MAR are used to create a set of state-level variables measuring the extent of formal and informal discrimination against minority groups. The authors then test whether states with higher levels of discrimination against minority groups are more likely to rely on force when involved in an international dispute, controlling for other possible causes of state use of force. Ultimately, the authors confirm their hypotheses that states characterized by domestic inequality with regard to ethnic minorities are more likely to exhibit higher levels of hostility and to use force first when involved in an interstate conflict.

Current scholarship on the international relations of ethnic conflict holds that such domestic‐level conflict can spread to become interstate conflict. Empirical research, theoretical discussions, and case studies have concluded that states suffering from violent ethnic conflict, specifically ethno‐political rebellion, can be either the victims of aggression or themselves the aggressors when ethnic conflict spreads to the international level. From both a scholarly perspective and the standpoint of policymaking it is important to know which possibility is more likely. This paper examines the behavior of states involved in militarized interstate disputes to test two possibilities: first, that states contending with ethnic rebellion are more likely to be the victims of aggression by outside actors. Alternatively, that states contending with ethnic rebellion are more likely to take aggressive action against outside states. Statistical analysis of ethnic rebellion data and militarized interstate dispute data covering the period 1980–1992 finds that states suffering from ethnic rebellion are more likely to use force and use force first when involved in international disputes than states without similar insurgency problems.

Rogue states have typically been characterized as those states that consistently violate accepted international norms of behavior. While US foreign policymakers and policy analysts have identified rogue states as those violating a narrow set of international norms of external conduct, specifically terrorism sponsorship and illicit pursuit of banned weapons, this article proposes an alternative understanding of rogue state status that harks back to earlier notions of international pariah states, isolated from the rest of international society, owing to their egregious treatment of their own citizens. Building on Galtung's concept of structural violence and feminist insights concerning the interconnectedness of violence at all levels of human society, the authors develop a rogue state index to identify human rights rogues, based on ethnic and gender discrimination and the violation of personal integrity rights. An important part of the rogue state formula developed by policymakers over the recent decades is the expectation that such states represent dangers to international peace and stability. Focusing on the recognized international human rights norms of non-discrimination and security of person, and informed by the causal mechanisms inherent in the normative explanation for the democratic peace, this article tests whether human rights rogues are more likely to become involved in militarized interstate conflicts and violent interstate conflicts. The results of the analysis show that human rights rogues are more likely to become involved in militarized interstate disputes in general, and violent interstate disputes specifically, than other states during the period 1980–2001, suggesting that policymakers must keep a close watch on serial human rights abusers, while seeking to identify future threats to international security.

We explore and define the concept of a 'rogue' state based on a state's domestic patterns of behavior. We combine measures of domestic gender equality, ethnic discrimination and state repression to identify characteristics of rogue states. Once we have identified rogue states, we perform logistic regression to predict whether rogue states are more likely to be the aggressors during international disputes -whether they are more likely to use force first during interstate conflict, controlling for other possible causes of state use of force. This research adds to a growing body of scholarship in International Relations regarding the behavior of states involved in conflict, which demonstrates that states with higher levels of inequality, repression and violence exhibit higher levels of violence during international disputes and during international crises. This argument is most fully developed within feminist scholarship; however, research in the field of ethnopolitical conflict has also highlighted the negative impact of domestic discrimination and violence on state behavior at the international level.