Public Opinion as a Domestic Constraint in International Negotiations: Two-Level Games in the Anglo-Irish Peace Process

Abstract

This article aims to broaden the theoretical foundations of the two-level games approach to understanding international negotiations by considering the conditions under which public opinion can act as a domestic constraint on the ability of international negotiators to reach agreement. In determining the role that public opinion plays, three factors are of central importance: (1) the preferences of the public relative to those of decision makers and other domestic constituents; (2) the intensity of the issue under negotiation; and (3) the power of the public to ratify a potential agreement. Evidence from the last decade of Anglo-Irish negotiations over the future and status of Northern Ireland shows that public opinion acts as a constraint on negotiators when the public has the power to directly ratify an international agreement. When the public's power to ratify an agreement is indirect, the intensity of the issue under negotiation will play a critical role in determining whether public preferences serve as a constraint on decision makers.One of the most compelling aspects of the two-level games approach is that it not only serves to explain the dynamics involved in international negotiations, it also challenges the realist paradigm which treats states as unitary rational actors, a perspective that continues to loom large in the international relations discipline. Instead, the two-level games approach provides an alternative way of thinking about the factors that influence the way nations interact. Two-level games analysis provides a framework by which we can observe and assess the impact of domestic preferences and institutions on international politics.A principal criticism of the two-level games approach in general, however, is that the two-level game as currently described is more a metaphor than a full-fledged theory. Moravcsik writes that for this approach to move from metaphor to theory, three essential theoretical building blocks are needed: "specifications of domestic politics (the nature of the 'win-sets'), of the international negotiating environment (the determinants of interstate bargaining outcomes), and the statesman's preferences"International Studies Quarterly (1998) 42, 545-565

Holding Out for Concession: The Quest for Gain in the Negotiation of International Agreements

“…The two-level framework allows for a systematic analysis of the factors that determine the "win set" of negotiated settlements that will be ratified by the relevant domestic constituencies. Numerous international negotiations, from trade talks to security summits (Stein, 1993), and peace processes (Trumbore, 1998) have been analyzed using Putman's framework. Hug and Konig (2002) use the two-level framework to analyze the Amsterdam Treaty that consolidates EU agreements on economic, security, and foreign policy issues.…”

Political culture, alternative politics and foreign policy: The case of Israel

“…It has been argued, however, that the two-level game is more a metaphor than a full-fledged theory, lacking three essential building blocks: specification of domestic politics, of the international environment, and the state's foreign policy preferences (Moravcsik, 1993;Trumbore, 1998). The understanding of the two-level game, therefore, requires the unpacking of the domestic and the international levels.…”

“…In peace negotiation, like in war, public opinion can act as a constraint that limits government's negotiation leverage. Public opinion seems to matter most when there is a lack of congruence between the public's preferences and decision maker's preferences, when the issue under negotiation is of intense interest and when the public has either direct or indirect power to ratify an international agreement (Trumbore, 1998).…”

“…Domestic institutions are important both in filtering the forces that confront policymakers and in constituting the relevant actors (Caporaso, 1997). Once citizens are mobilized on a certain issue, governments have to pay attention to voter opinion in both domestic and foreign policymaking (Trumbore, 1998). In the US, for example, ethnic or diaspora politics was found to be an important determinant in US foreign policy (Glazer and Moynihan, 1975;Shain, 1994).…”

De la crisis del Beagle al Acta de Montevideo de 1979 : el establecimiento de la mediación en un «juego en dos niveles»

“…Los gobiernos, por estas razones, son más conservadores y, según las miradas realistas, intentarán mantener esas discusiones libres de interferencias. No obstante, trabajos anteriores han recurrido a argumentos en dos niveles para analizar casos que involucraban cuestiones de seguridad, tales como las negociaciones de paz entre israelíes y palestinos (Mor 1997), entre israelíes y egipcios (Stein 1993) o entre ingleses e irlandeses (Trumbore 1998(Trumbore , 2001, así como las negociaciones entre Estados Unidos y la Unión Soviética sobre Berlín durante la Guerra Fría (Snyder 1993) y para el acuerdo de eliminación de misiles de corto y medio alcance durante los años ochenta. (Eichenberg 1993), los esfuerzos de colaboración en materia de armamentos entre Francia y Alemania entre los años setenta y ochenta (Moravcsik 1993) y la formulación de la política exterior estadounidense hacia Cuba post-59 (LeoGrande 1998).…”