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Tom Dougherty argues that consenting, like prormsmg, requires both an appropriate mental attitude and a communication of that attitude. 1 Thus, just as a promise is not a promise unless it is communicated to the promisee, consent is not consent unless it is communicated to 'the relevant party or parties. And those like us, who believe consent is just the attitude, and that it can exist without its being communicated, are in error. 2 Or so Dougherty argues. We, however, are unpersuaded. We believe Dougherty is right about promises, but wrong about consent. Although each of us gives a slightly different account of the attitude that constitutes consent, we all agree that consent is constituted by that attitude and need not be communicated in order to alter the morality of another's conduct. Consider the following scenario, which we shall call Wanted Sex: Sue wants Sam to have sex with her. Yet she is afraid that if she communicates that to him, he might think she is "easy" or (Ctrashy" and ultimately reject a long-term relationship with her, a relationship she desires. One night, Sam begins making sexual advances with Sue. Sue wants him to proceed, but she says nothing to encourage him and indeed resists him with some force at each step of the way. This resistance does not deter him, and ultimately they have sex. Sue is delighted. Things worked out just as she had hoped. Sam had sex with her, but she was able to communicate that she was not consenting to it.