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Segregation and radioactive analysis of aerosols according to their aerodynamic size were performed in France, Austria, the Czech Republic, Poland, Germany, and Greece after the arrival of contaminated air masses following the nuclear accident at the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plant in March 2011. On the whole and regardless of the location, the highest activity levels correspond either to the finest particle fraction or to the upper size class. Regarding anthropogenic radionuclides, the activity median aerodynamic diameter (AMAD) ranged between 0.25 and 0.71 μm for (137)Cs, from 0.17 to 0.69 μm for (134)Cs, and from 0.30 to 0.53 μm for (131)I, thus in the "accumulation mode" of the ambient aerosol (0.1-1 μm). AMAD obtained for the naturally occurring radionuclides (7)Be and (210)Pb ranged from 0.20 to 0.53 μm and 0.29 to 0.52 μm, respectively. Regarding spatial variations, AMADs did not show large differences from place to place compared with what was observed concerning bulk airborne levels registered on the European scale. When air masses arrived in Europe, AMADs for (131)I were about half those for cesium isotopes. Higher AMAD for cesium probably results from higher AMAD observed at the early stage of the accident in Japan. Lower AMAD for (131)I can be explained by the adsorption of gaseous iodine on particles of all sizes met during transport, especially for small particles. Additionally, weathering conditions (rain) encountered during transport and in Europe in March and April contributed to the equilibrium of the gaseous to total (131)I ratio. AMAD slightly increased with time for (131)I whereas a clear decreasing trend was observed with the AMADs for (137)Cs and (134)Cs. On average, the associated geometric standard deviation (GSD) appeared to be higher for iodine than for cesium isotopes. These statements also bear out a gaseous (131)I transfer on ambient particles of a broad size range during transport. Highest weighted activity levels were found on the 0.49-0.95 μm and on the 0.18-0.36 μm size ranges in France and in Poland, respectively. The contribution from resuspension of old deposited (137)Cs was assessed for the coarse particle fractions only for the first sampling week.

Traces of particulate radioactive iodine (I) were detected in the European atmosphere in January/February 2017. Concentrations of this nuclear fission product were very low, ranging 0.1 to 10 μBq m except at one location in western Russia where they reached up to several mBq m. Detections have been reported continuously over an 8-week period by about 30 monitoring stations. We examine possible emission source apportionments and rank them considering their expected contribution in terms of orders of magnitude from typical routine releases: radiopharmaceutical production units > sewage sludge incinerators > nuclear power plants > spontaneous fission of uranium in soil. Inverse modeling simulations indicate that the widespread detections of I resulted from the combination of multiple source releases. Among them, those from radiopharmaceutical production units remain the most likely. One of them is located in Western Russia and its estimated source term complies with authorized limits. Other existing sources related toI use (medical purposes or sewage sludge incineration) can explain detections on a rather local scale. As an enhancing factor, the prevailing wintertime meteorological situations marked by strong temperature inversions led to poor dispersion conditions that resulted in higher concentrations exceeding usual detection limits in use within the informal Ring of Five (Ro5) monitoring network.

During recent years, the assessment of possible radiological consequences of a terrorist attack associated with a release of radioactive substances (RaS) has been in the focus of interest of emergency preparedness and radiation protection specialists, as well as experts dealing with the dispersion of harmful substances in the atmosphere. Suitable tools for these analyses are applications of mathematical and physical models and simulation of this attack under 'realistic' conditions. The work presented here summarises the results of four tests, in which a RaS (a Tc-99 m solution) was dispersed over a free area with the use of an industrial explosive. Detection methods and techniques employed in these tests are described and values characterising the RaS dispersion--dose rates, surface activities in horizontal and vertical directions, volume activities, their space and time distributions and mass concentrations of aerosols produced after the explosion are presented and compared. These data will be applied to a comparison of outcomes of models used for the assessment of radiation accidents as well as in future field tests carried out under conditions of more complex geometry (indoor environment, terrain obstacles, etc.).