Theories of civil war highlight how relative power affects conflict onset, dynamics, strategy, outcome, and duration. Yet most studies of civil war have not been able to capture rebel power adequately and often rely on national-level characteristics to infer relative power distributions. This study addresses this shortcoming by using a troop strength measure to test arguments about how relative power affects the likelihood of civil conflict settlement. Drawing on the international crisis bargaining literature, while noting the inherent differences between interstate and intrastate conflicts, this study argues that the condition of power parity increases the likelihood of negotiated settlement and ceasefire. Weak rebels are unable to achieve concessions through negotiation since governments view them as minor threats. Yet governments have difficulty defeating weak rebels due to an emphasis on guerrilla warfare. On the other end of the spectrum, rebels that are superior to the government in strength are unlikely to settle given their power advantage. Strong rebels that can rival the strength of the government (i.e. they are near parity) can exact more concessions because fighting at parity exposes information about how long each side can hold out while escalating the costs of war, giving each side a greater incentive to negotiate and eventually seek a ceasefire or peace agreement. This argument is supported using data on 112 dyads in the post-Cold War period.

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Research on the relationship between civil conflict and repression has led to one conclusion—the law-like finding that states respond to internal challengers with repression—and one puzzle with competing hypotheses—whether state repression escalates civil conflict or not. Studies of repression’s effect on conflict dynamics have been limited to case studies and subnational designs, which limits the external validity of the arguments. Studies of conflict’s effect on repression have treated conflict as a control variable without taking into account the inherent endogeneity between internal conflict and state repression. This article contributes by providing a general, cross-national study of repression’s effect on conflict, and vice versa, for external validity. Results of simultaneous equation models demonstrate that both directions of the relationship between state repression and conflict are positive and significant—suggesting a cyclical relationship—while single equation models with a lag structure establish that the effect of repression on conflict is greater than the reverse.

This article introduces a regional trade agreement (RTA) simulation for undergraduate students. The simulation uses a multilevel bargaining framework, in which students can represent not only governments of negotiating countries but also domestic interests. By allowing students to experience international bargaining at different levels, they gain a deeper understanding of controversial international trade processes.I n recent decades, dramatic changes in higher education have led to new practices and methods, extending classroom styles beyond traditional lecture formats. Active learning and/or learner-centered teaching has burgeoned in discussions of enhancing student knowledge and skill-building. 1 Other than purely academic goals, many professors view active learning as a means for "setting students' minds on fire" (Carnes 2011, A72). Student knowledge and skills may increase through these methods, and they may be more motivated and involved in the learning process (Frederking 2005;Giovanello, Kirk, and Kromer 2013;Krain and Lantis 2006;Shellman and Turan 2006). As a result, professors have incorporated experiential learning, classroom simulations, "flipped" classrooms, web-based learning, and other techniques into their teaching practices.This article introduces a new classroom simulation that resembles the multilevel negotiations of a regional trade agreement (RTA). The concept of free trade and the practice of negotiating trade agreements continue to be a source of considerable controversy and confusion, exemplified by the ongoing case of the Trans-Pacific Partnership negotiations. In our experience, students find that they lack the knowledge of how trade agreements work to engage the issue beyond simplistic partisan talking points. We believe a classroom simulation provides an ideal opportunity for students to learn through experience not only the basics of international trade but also the complicated domestic politics involved.By simulating multilevel bargaining, the simulation described in this article puts students in the position of various domestic interests and requires them to negotiate at both the country and international levels. By disaggregating domestic interests, we move beyond existing country-level simulations (Switky and Avilés 2007) to give students a deeper understanding of how domestic politics-that is, coalition building, agenda setting, and the role of veto players-affects international politics. 2 This framework also allows cross-country interaction among similar groups (e.g., transnational labor cooperation), which reminds students that states do not always operate as unitary actors.Building on the structure of Stodden's (2012) simulation concerning the provision of humanitarian aid, we adapted it to RTA circumstances. Although the simulation is loosely based on real-world RTAs, 3 we use abstract countries. Our experience with using real countries is that students either try to replicate how that country acted or believe they do not know enough about its history to act on it...

When the subject matter is difficult for students, such international trade, achieving higher-order learning can be challenging. We developed a regional trade agreement simulation (RTA) to help solve student learning difficulties. In the simulation, students attempt to negotiate a RTA in small groups over two weeks. We then use this RTA simulation to evaluate whether it contributes to student knowledge, motivation, and critical thinking ability. Most previous studies have been limited to investigating student knowledge retention and motivation, but it remains an open question whether active learning techniques (like simulations) help achieve higher-order, critical thinking learning objectives. We have conducted surveys and pre-/post-tests in three courses at different universities. From multiple-choice questions and essay responses, we evaluate the simulation's contributions to student knowledge attainment, motivation about the subject, and improvements in critical thinking ability.