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It has become fashionable to try to prove the impossibility of there being a God. More recently, James Rachels has offered a moral argument intended to show that there could not be a being worthy of worship. What Rachels attempts to establish is that obedience to divine commands would require giving up the role of moral autonomy. If this were so, it would destroy the prospects for a defensible divine command theory of morality. This chapter examines the position Rachels is arguing for. It shows that Rachel's attempt to prove that no being could be a fitting object of worship rests on a false premise and its, therefore, unsound. This chapter also shows that the genuine philosophical perplexity which motivates Rachels's argument can be dispelled without too much difficulty.

No abstract

No abstract

The view that morality in some way depends, at least in part, upon the will of God is an important theme in the history of philosophy. In recent times this idea has not been taken very seriously by prominent moral philosophers. It is often assumed that the view has been refuted or can be shown to be quite implausible in the light of accepted modern doctrine about morality. Based on the belief that this assumption is mistaken, this book takes a fresh look at this issue. It asks whether some version of the claim that human morality depends upon divine commands can be defended against serious and sustained philosophical criticism. It explores whether significantly different versions of divine command theory can be formulated. And, finally, it attempts to discover whether divine command theories are consistent with or can be grafted on to other recent theories of the logic of some of the moral concepts.