No abstract

A fundamental problem for economic development is that most poor countries have 'weak state' which are incapable or unwilling to provide basic public goods such as law enforcement, order, education and infrastructure. In Africa this is often attributed to the persistence of 'indirect rule' from the colonial period. In this paper we discuss the ways in which a state constructed on the basis of indirect rule is weak and the mechanisms via which this has persisted since independence in Sierra Leone. We also present a hypothesis as to why the extent to which indirect rule has persisted varies greatly within Africa, linking it to the presence or the absence of large centralized pre-colonial polities within modern countries. Countries which had such a polity, such as Ghana and Uganda, tended to abolish indirect rule since it excessively empowered traditional rulers at the expense of post-colonial elites. Our argument provides a new mechanism which can explain the positive correlation between pre-colonial political centralization and modern public goods and development outcomes.

We are greatly indebted to Jan Vansina for his encouragement and suggestions and to Daron Acemoglu and particularly James Fenske for their comments. We also thank Gérard Roland, Gylfi Zoega and an anonymous referee. This paper was written in honor of Thrainn Eggertsson on the occasion of his retirement from the University of Iceland. Any of us who have worked on institutions owe a great debt to his original and pathbreaking research. The views expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Bureau of Economic Research. NBER working papers are circulated for discussion and comment purposes. They have not been peerreviewed or been subject to the review by the NBER Board of Directors that accompanies official NBER publications.

We are greatly indebted to Jan Vansina for his encouragement and suggestions and to Daron Acemoglu and particularly James Fenske for their comments. We also thank Gérard Roland, Gylfi Zoega and an anonymous referee. This paper was written in honor of Thrainn Eggertsson on the occasion of his retirement from the University of Iceland. Any of us who have worked on institutions owe a great debt to his original and pathbreaking research. The views expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Bureau of Economic Research. NBER working papers are circulated for discussion and comment purposes. They have not been peerreviewed or been subject to the review by the NBER Board of Directors that accompanies official NBER publications.