Indirect Rule and State Weakness in Africa: Sierra Leone in Comparative Perspective

Abstract

A fundamental problem for economic development is that most poor countries have 'weak state' which are incapable or unwilling to provide basic public goods such as law enforcement, order, education and infrastructure. In Africa this is often attributed to the persistence of 'indirect rule' from the colonial period. In this paper we discuss the ways in which a state constructed on the basis of indirect rule is weak and the mechanisms via which this has persisted since independence in Sierra Leone. We also present a hypothesis as to why the extent to which indirect rule has persisted varies greatly within Africa, linking it to the presence or the absence of large centralized pre-colonial polities within modern countries. Countries which had such a polity, such as Ghana and Uganda, tended to abolish indirect rule since it excessively empowered traditional rulers at the expense of post-colonial elites. Our argument provides a new mechanism which can explain the positive correlation between pre-colonial political centralization and modern public goods and development outcomes.

On the Ethnic Origins of African Development: Chiefs and Precolonial Political Centralization

“…13 Focusing on Sierra Leone, Acemoglu, Reed, and Robinson (2014) and Acemoglu, Chaves, Osafo-Kwaako, and Robinson (2014) describe how local chiefs cooperated with the British and subsequently with the national government in a "quid pro quo" regime where traditional leaders provided votes and support for national policies in exchange for legitimacy, strengthening their role, and other perks. Casey (2012) documents the strong correlation between ethnic origin and voting in Sierra Leone.…”

“…Turning now to a disaster case, Chaves and Robinson (2011) and Acemoglu, Chaves, Osafo-Kwaako, and Robinson (2014) argue that a part of Sierra Leone’s post-independence devastating performance can be traced to the lack of large and politically complex kingdoms before colonization. Their narrative suggests that the absence of a centralized bureaucracy allowed the British to implement extractive policies using self-appointed paramount chiefs that were not accountable to the local community.…”

Decentralization as a Post-Conflict Strategy: Local Government Discretion and Accountability in Sierra Leone

“…The important role of Chiefdoms was reconfirmed by the adoption of the Chieftaincy Act of 2009. The Chieftaincy Act of 2009 institutionalized the power of traditional authorities, acquired during the colonial era, and “… froze the institution in the form it had existed at the end of the colonial period” (Acemoglu, Chaves, Osafo‐Kwaako and Robinson : 5). According to Larizza and Glynn (), the adoption of this Act was a deliberate attempt to re‐legitimize the institutions of traditional authorities, as their popularity and legitimacy had been greatly weakened during the civil war.…”

“…Traditional authorities derive their resiliency from social embeddedness in an environment of agrarian poverty, not necessarily from formal institutional capacity. According to Acemoglu, Chaves, Osafo‐Kwaako and Robinson (: 24) “… the persistence of indirect rule after independence of Sierra Leone was initially caused by the fact that those empowered by indirect rule were able to capture and indeed to structure the post‐colonial state.”…”

The Prospects and Politics of Social Protection Reform in Zambia

“…This represented a low cost local governance system that authorised traditional Chiefs (brokers) to rule their rural constituencies in exchange for order, peace and taxes. Rural dwellers were accountable to their Chiefs and Chiefs to the British Colonial Officers (Acemoglu et al 2013). While direct governance, through the establishment of a formal local government system, expanded to rural areas after independence, services remained limited especially in more isolated rural areas (Duncan et al 2003).…”