In 2011 all ECB publications feature a motif taken from the €100 banknote.

The monetary policy framework of the Eurosystem has received considerable attention in recent years: there is a well-established and rich literature on the price stability objective, as well as the two-pillar strategy of the ECB. This is less the case for the regular monetary policy preparations and the decision-making process. This article provides an insider's roadmap to the procedures to prepare monetary policy decisions by the Governing Council of the ECB. The architecture of the Eurosystem permits the processing and analysis of a vast amount of national and aggregate economic, financial and monetary data and assists the Governing Council in taking monetary policy decisions - and this each month. Our aim is to describe the role of a variety of committees and sub-committees that prepare and support the monetary policy decision-making process. A federal organization is at the heart of this process. At the top of the pyramid of information there is a two-tiered committee structure with the Executive Board taking the lead in bringing together most of the economic, financial and monetary analyses, and the Governing Council utilizing that information, for its monthly economic and monetary analyses. Copyright (c) 2010 The Author(s). Journal compilation (c) 2010 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

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Since the mid-1980s the world economy has gone through profound transformations of which the sources and effects are probably not yet completely understood. The process of continuous integration in trade, production and financial markets across countries and economic regions -which is what is generally defined as "globalisation" -affects directly the conduct of monetary policy in a variety of respects. The aim of this paper is to present an overview of the structural implications of globalisation for the domestic economies of developed countries and to deduct from these implications lessons for the conduct of monetary policy, and in particular the assessment of risks to price stability. JEL codes: E5, F4

AbstractOver the last years, independent central banks were often criticized. Many critics felt that the fatal flaw of the current system lied in its independent nature. Some critics argued that the remedy to such problems was to replace independence with interdependence. Such a drastic measure is completely unnecessary. No more time should be lost discussing further the merits or the weaknesses of central bank independence. But taking central bank independence as a given, one should simply try to equip central bankers with the mandates, the tools, and the values best fitted to help them face future shocks. Deeper checks and balances with other institutions and the fair financing of investment by all economic agents, including startups and SMEs, are urgently necessary to head off financial crises that will inevitably arise in this era of growing wealth inequality, disruptive technologies and climate change.