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A significant amount of scholarly attention has focused on explaining variation in implementation of EU outputs. Most studies have concentrated either on the factors determining compliance with Directives or on the processes leading Member States to applying soft law provisions. Little attention has however been paid to the determinants of the implementation of soft law. Hence the focus of this paper: why do Member States implement EU outputs if they have no legal obligation to do so? The present study delves into the implementation of a soft instrument, the European fund for the integration of foreigners, and explains Member States' response to it through a policy‐specific mechanism. I show that when there is little possibility of oversight from above, government preferences are not constrained by Commission but by public opinion and organized civil society. Empirical evidence is drawn from the application of time‐series‐cross‐section methods to an original dataset.

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Studies have sought to explain variation in protection recognition rates between EU member states with, however, limited explanatory power. Surprisingly, few have contemplated the role of the administration, despite it being at the centre of the process through which asylum claims are examined. We posit that recognition rates are significantly affected by administrative capacity, although the administration's action may be mitigated by political factors. Our findings show that administrative effectiveness and experience in asylum matters yield higher recognition rates. We show that government preferences and the overall political context affect protection recognition, too. Importantly, we also find that the mechanisms at play are different if we consider the different forms of protection.