Pandemic influenza has the epidemic potential to kill millions of people. While various preventive measures exist (i.a., vaccination and school closures), deciding on strategies that lead to their most effective and efficient use remains challenging. To this end, individual-based epidemiological models are essential to assist decision makers in determining the best strategy to curb epidemic spread. However, individual-based models are computationally intensive and it is therefore pivotal to identify the optimal strategy using a minimal amount of model evaluations. Additionally, as epidemiological modeling experiments need to be planned, a computational budget needs to be specified a priori. Consequently, we present a new sampling technique to optimize the evaluation of preventive strategies using fixed budget best-arm identification algorithms. We use epidemiological modeling theory to derive knowledge about the reward distribution which we exploit using Bayesian best-arm identification algorithms (i.e., Top-two Thompson sampling and BayesGap). We evaluate these algorithms in a realistic experimental setting and demonstrate that it is possible to identify the optimal strategy using only a limited number of model evaluations, i.e., 2-to-3 times faster compared to the uniform sampling method, the predominant technique used for epidemiological decision making in the literature. Finally, we contribute and evaluate a statistic for Top-two Thompson sampling to inform the decision makers about the confidence of an arm recommendation.

The recent paper “Reward is Enough” by Silver, Singh, Precup and Sutton posits that the concept of reward maximisation is sufficient to underpin all intelligence, both natural and artificial, and provides a suitable basis for the creation of artificial general intelligence. We contest the underlying assumption of Silver et al. that such reward can be scalar-valued. In this paper we explain why scalar rewards are insufficient to account for some aspects of both biological and computational intelligence, and argue in favour of explicitly multi-objective models of reward maximisation. Furthermore, we contend that even if scalar reward functions can trigger intelligent behaviour in specific cases, this type of reward is insufficient for the development of human-aligned artificial general intelligence due to unacceptable risks of unsafe or unethical behaviour.