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This article examines the rise of various representations of post-colonial states to highlight how thinking and practice that arose and prevailed during the Cold War still persists in the present ostensibly post-cold war era. After initially outlining the historical construction of the social sciences, it is shown how the annexation of the social sciences evolved in the early post-World War II and cold-war era as an adjunct of the world hegemonic pretensions of the USA. A critique is then developed of various representations of post-colonial states that arose in the making of the 'Third World' during the cold-war annexation of the social sciences. Yet such practices still persist in the present, as evidenced by more contemporary representations of post-colonial states commonly revolving around elements of deficiency or failure, eg 'quasi-states', 'weak states', 'failed states' or 'rogue states'. A more historicised consideration of post-colonial statehood, that recasts conceptions of state-civil society antagonisms in terms of an appreciation of political economy and critical security concerns, offers an alternative to these representations of 'failed states'. By historicising various representations of 'failed states' it becomes possible to open up critical ways of thinking about the political economy of security and to consider alternative futures in the world order

Unlike some other staples of security studies that do not even register the issue, Buzan & Hansen’s (2009) The Evolution of International Security Studies unambiguously identifies ‘Western-centrism’ as a problem. This article seeks to make the point, however, that treating heretofore-understudied insecurities (such as those experienced in the non-West) as a ‘blind spot’ of the discipline may prevent us from fully recognizing the ways in which such ‘historical absences’ have been constitutive of security both in theory and in practice. Put differently, the discipline’s ‘Western-centric’ character is no mere challenge for students of security studies. The ‘historical absence’ from security studies of non-Western insecurities and approaches has been a ‘constitutive practice’ that has shaped (and continues to shape) both the discipline and subjects and objects of security in different parts of the world.

Despite the prevalence of state‐based approaches to security studies during the Cold War, alternative ways of thinking about security—focusing on the individual and society—also developed during this time period. However, in the post‐Cold War era the primacy of the state in considerations of security has come under increasing challenge from a variety of perspectives. In this essay, the development of the study of individual and societal dimensions of security is traced and discussed against the background of the end of the Cold War. The first part of the essay examines the evolution of thinking about individual and societal dimensions of security during the Cold War. The second part focuses on the post‐Cold War revival in thinking about these aspects of security. The essay concludes by considering the future of world politics conceived of as a “risk society” and the implications for individual and societal dimensions of security.

Following Critical Geopoliticians' re-formulation of geopolitics as discourse, this article historically traces, politically contextualizes, and empirically analyzes the linguistic practices as found in myriad actors' formal geopolitical writings and public articulations in Turkey. It shows how the production and dissemination of a particular understanding of geopolitics as a ''scientific'' perspective on statecraft, and the military as an actor licensed to craft state policies (by virtue of its mastery over geopolitical knowledge) has allowed the military to play a central role in shaping domestic political processes. Subsequent to the erosion of bi-partisan consensus on foreign policy from the mid-1960s onwards, civilian actors also began to tap geopolitics but as a foreign policy tool. By the end of the 1990s, geopolitics had become rooted in the discourses of both military and civilian actors shaping