Manuscript Type: EmpiricalResearch Question/Issue: Does corporate governance explain US bank performance during the period leading up to the financial crisis? We adopt the factor structure by Larcker, Richardson, and Tuna (2007) to measure multiple dimensions of corporate governance for 236 public commercial banks. Research Findings/Insights: Findings reveal corporate governance factors explain financial performance better than loan quality. We find strong support for a negative association between leverage and both financial performance and loan quality. CEO duality is negatively associated with financial performance. The extent of executive incentive pay is positively associated with financial performance but exhibits a negative association with loan quality in the long-run. We find a concave relationship between financial performance and both board size and average director age. We provide weak evidence of an association of anti-takeover devices, board meeting frequency, and affiliated nature of committees with financial performance. Theoretical/Academic Implications: We apply agency theory to the banking industry and expect that the governanceperformance linkage might differ due to the unique regulatory and business environment. Results extend Larcker et al. (2007), especially regarding the concave relationship between board size and performance, and the role of leverage. Given the lack of support for our agency theory predictions, we suggest that alternative theories are needed to understand the performance implications of corporate governance at banks. Practitioner/Policy Implications: We offer contributions to regulators, especially for ongoing financial reforms of capital requirements and executive compensation. Specifically, we show a consistent negative association between leverage and performance, which supports the current debate on Tier I capital limits for banks.

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This paper examines the contrasting influence of portfolio lending and securitization in the resolution of distressed commercial real estate. The empirical analysis utilizes a large and unique data set of distressed commercial mortgages. The data set is constructed based on the recent financial crisis and includes portfolio and securitized loans. The main hypotheses address the marginal impact of portfolio versus securitized loans on the likelihood of resolution, resolution outcome, time to resolution and capital recovery rates. Conditional on a loan becoming troubled, we find that distressed commercial real estate loans held in a portfolio are more likely to be resolved and experience higher foreclosure rates compared to those that are securitized. Furthermore, portfolio loans experience shorter time to resolution and higher capital recovery rates when resolution is relatively swift. Our study is intended to contribute to the growing literature on distressed asset resolution and to provide new perspectives on how different lending options impact the financial resolution and workout process in a distressed commercial mortgage market.

Monetary policy, FOMC statements, Asymmetry, Securitized real estate markets, Two-factor empirical specification, G14, E44, E52,