a b s t r a c tThis research examines the mitigation of damaged trust stemming from supplier-induced disruptions. We used the critical incident technique on 302 buying firms in China to capture two (one successful, one unsuccessful) supplier-induced disruptions (yielding a total of 604 incidents) to test our theorizing grounded in justice theory. We find evidence that different aspects of trust damage (ability, benevolence, and integrity) can be mitigated through the supplier's selective use of appropriate justice approaches (procedural, interactional, or distributive justice), which, in turn, foster relationship continuity intentions. Within this realm, we make a number of contributions. First, we find that procedural justice is the most effective mechanism (followed by distributive justice and interactional justice) to recoup the damage to buyers' trust in the suppliers' ability, benevolence, and integrity. Second, we find that mitigating damaged ability is the most powerful precursor (followed by recuperating damaged integrity) for locking in future business. Conversely, the mitigation of damaged benevolence is not found to affect future business intentions. Third, our post hoc results suggest that disruptions and consequent mitigation efforts pose relational threats as well as opportunities-yet the "double-edged" nature is affected by the "base" level of trust (i.e., the trust level prior to the disruption). Broadly, our study suggests that suppliers can overcome the negative relational repercussions of disruptions (that they caused) by employing well-developed, but nuanced, mitigation efforts and, in doing so, repair, solidify or even enhance the relationships.

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I n this research, we examine a novel mechanism of interorganizational relationship dissolution: incoherence in a partner's behavior. We propose that the discrepancy between an exchange partner's opportunistic behavior and the focal firm's expectations may create a state of incoherence and uncertainty and that this effect can be damaging to the exchange even when the partner's behavior is better than expected. Using nearly 500 longitudinal, confidential reports of industrial buyers and sellers, we find supportive evidence that (1) the net effect of the discrepancy is initially positive when behavior is better than expected but becomes rapidly negative thereafter, and (2) the net effect of the discrepancy is always negative when behavior is worse than expected. Thus, these effects will generally damage the exchange even as the partner tries to improve the relationship. This gives insight into why exchange relationships that hit a downward spiral can be difficult, if not impossible, to salvage. We also show that the dysfunctional consequences of discrepancy are mitigated through exchange structures such as the magnitude of dependence on an organizational partner, the development phase of the relationship, and the presence of bilateral idiosyncratic investments. Implications for theory and the management of interorganizational relationships are developed.