Water pollution from non-point sources is a global environmental concern.Economists propose tradable permit systems as a solution, but they are difficult to implement due to the nature of non-point sources. We present a pollution offset system for trading non-point source water pollution permits. Conventional pollution offset systems suffer from thin markets and transaction costs. In this paper, we show how to overcome these problems with a centrally managed common-pool market. We define permits as allowable nitrate loading to a groundwater aquifer. This trading system utilizes estimates of potential nitrate leaching from land uses, a set of transport coefficients generated from a simulation of nitrate transport in groundwater, an online trading system, and a linear program to clear the market. We illustrate the concept using a hypothetical case study.

Nitrate discharges from diffuse agricultural sources significantly contribute to groundwater and surface water pollution. Tradable permit programs have been proposed as a means of controlling nitrate emissions efficiently, but trading is complicated by the dispersed and delayed effects of the diffuse pollution. Hence, markets in nitrate discharge permits should be carefully designed to account for the underlying spatial and temporal interactions. Nitrate permit markets can be designed similar to the modern electricity markets which use LPs to find the equilibrium prices because the two trading problems have close analogy.In this paper, we propose alternative LP models to find efficient permit prices for year-ahead markets. The model structure varies depending on the catchment hydro-geology and long-term goals of the community. We show how the market price structures are driven by the constraint structure under different environmental conditions. We discuss the physical and economic conditions required to assure consistent prices, the modeling of essential and optional constraints in an LP, and the problem of balancing resource allocation over time among delayed-response discharge units. We then extend the LP model to balance resource allocation over time and to improve the market performance.

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Nutrient trading and constructed wetlands are widely discussed solutions to reduce nutrient pollution. Nutrient markets usually include agricultural nonpoint sources and municipal and industrial point sources, but these markets rarely include investors who construct wetlands to sell nutrient reduction credits. We propose a new market design for trading nutrient credits, with both point source and non-point source traders, explicitly incorporating the option of landowners to build nutrient removal wetlands. The proposed trading program is designed as a smart market with centralized clearing, done with an optimization. The market design addresses the varying impacts of runoff over space and time, and the lumpiness of wetland investments. We simulated the market for the Big Bureau Creek watershed in north-central Illinois. We found that the proposed smart market would incentivize wetland construction by assuring reasonable payments for the ecosystem services provided. The proposed market mechanism selects wetland locations strategically taking into account both the cost and nutrient removal