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The existence of an optimal control policy and the techniques for finding it are grounded fundamentally in a global perspective. These techniques can be of limited value when the global behavior of the system is difficult to characterize, as it may be when the system is nonlinear, when the input is constrained, or when only partial information is available regarding system dynamics or the environment. Satisficing control theory is an alternative approach that is compatible with the limited rationality associated with such systems. This theory is extended by the introduction of the notion of strong satisficing to provide a systematic procedure for the design of satisficing controls. The power of the satisficing approach is illustrated by applications to representative control problems.

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Future generations of air traffic management systems may give appropriately equipped aircraft the freedom to change flight paths in real time. This would require a conflict avoidance and resolution scheme that is both decentralized and cooperative. We describe a multiagent solution to aircraft conflict resolution based on satisficing game theory. A key feature of the theory is that satisficing decision makers form their preferences by taking into consideration the preferences of others, unlike conventional game theory that models agents that maximize self-interest metrics. This makes possible situational altruism, a sophisticated form of unselfish behavior in which the preferences of another agent are accommodated provided that the other agent will actually take advantage of the sacrifice. This approach also makes possible the creation of groups in which every decision maker receives due consideration. We present simulation results from a variety of scenarios in which the aircraft are limited to constant-speed headingchange maneuvers to avoid conflicts. We show that the satisficing approach results in behavior that is attractive both in terms of safety and performance. The results underscore the applicability of satisficing game theory to multiagent problems in which selfinterested participants are inclined to cooperation.

The next generation of air traffic control will require automated decision support systems in order to meet safety, reliability, flexibility, and robustness demands in an environment of steadily increasing air traffic density. Automation is most readily implemented in free flight, the segment of flight between airports. In this environment, centralized control is impractical, and on-board distributed decision making is required. To be effective, such decision making must be cooperative. Satisficing game theory provides a theoretical framework in which autonomous decision makers may coordinate their decisions. The key feature of the theory is that, unlike conventional game theory which is purely egotistic in its structure, it provides a natural mechanism for decision makers to form their preferences by taking into consideration the preferences of others. In this way, a controlled form of conditional altruism is possible, such that agents are able to compromise so that every decision maker receives due consideration in a group environment. Simulations demonstrate that reliable performance can be achieved with densities on the order of 50 planes per ten thousand square miles.