This research aims to investigate Japan’s motivation to be involved in the South China Sea dispute despite Japan’s far distance from the conflicted area. Utilizing the qualitative research method, this research analyzes Japanese Government official documents and relevant literature to achieve the research objective. The research discovers that Japan’s main interest in the South China Sea is to articulate a safer maritime lane for the sake of its Free and Open Indo-Pacific agenda by balancing China’s assertiveness in the region. Employing a regional security complex framework, this research sees that Japan, by its presence in the South China Sea, tries to intensify the security interaction with Southeast Asian counterparts to expand the Northeast Asian regional subcomplex, aiming to strengthen the perception of China as a threat to Southeast Asian countries. The South China Sea involvement will fortify Japan’s security interlink with Southeast Asian counterparts, balancing China’s expansive trait in the maritime zone, accelerating Tokyo-initiated Free and Open Indo-Pacific vision.

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This research explains how states’ expanding security policy contributes to its credibility of threats in international relations. The context is represented by the case of Indonesia’s South China Sea policy expansion under Joko Widodo administration, which became more assertive. Most of the current literatures picture Indonesia’s South China Sea engagement in the setting of its relation with China and its effort to build regional stability. This paper aims to locate the case of Indonesia’s South China Sea policy into a broader context of Indo-Pacific geostrategic landscape. To achieve this objective, this research utilized credibility concept in international relations as analytical framework. This research argues that Indonesia’s bolder and more institutionalized security policy in navigating South China Sea stand-offs aims to build its credibility of threat in Indo-Pacific circuit. With more credibility of threat, it expects to escalate Indonesia’s strategic positioning as it has more credibility to deter China’s intrusion. By that, Indonesia is seen to be more reliable to maintain the maritime stability and lead more strategic partners be more committed to cooperate with Indonesia, as the linchpin connecting Indian Ocean and Pacific Ocean.

This research aims to compare the advocacy model of Children Living with HIV/AIDS (CLWH) informal--non-professional and formal--nonprofessional network, represented by Lentera Anak Surakarta (LAS) and Lentera Anak Pelangi Jakarta (LAP) respectively. The characterization of the network was adapted from Lhawang Ugyel conceptual framework on four types of social network based on their personnel types and formality. Meanwhile, the comparison was made under the metric of 3 advocacy channels; legislation, political and mobilization process. This research found out that LAS informal-non-professional advocacy model reflected a more dominant usage of law and political channel compared to LAP formal-non-professional model since LAS was rising from marginalized society hence they need well lobbying politically and involving in legal drafting. Meanwhile, LAP had shown a more systematic maneuver on the socialization and mobilization channel of advocacy. This was because LAP was formally driven by academia spectrum that could establish methodical movements of CLWH advocacy; thus the engagement with policymaker was less prioritized, even though it was still an essential element of its advocacy.

This article analyzes Japan’s interest in revoking its self-imposed military export ban in 2014 despite of its decades-long lucrative pacifism. The pacifism implementations includes partial and total military export ban, consecutively in 1967 and 1976. To puzzle out the question, this journal article utilized “Balance of Power” Concept by Morgenthau. This article found out that Shinzo Abe grand vision to transfer and export weaponries is balancing People’s Republic of China assertiveness in East China Sea by (1) reinforcing military alliances and (2) enhancing internal armaments. The alliances were strengthened by distributing weaponries to states in tension with People’s Republic of China and fortifying military industry cooperation with United States. The domestic military buildup was expected to escalate as arm export stimulated their domestic defense industry development. That includes the economic growth stimulus under Abenomics, in which also aimed to increase the military budget that leads to more robust defense.