Herding is a form of convergent social behaviour that can be broadly defined as the alignment of the thoughts or behaviours of individuals in a group (herd) through local interaction and without centralized coordination. We suggest that herding has a broad application, from intellectual fashion to mob violence; and that understanding herding is particularly pertinent in an increasingly interconnected world. An integrated approach to herding is proposed, describing two key issues: mechanisms of transmission of thoughts or behaviour between agents, and patterns of connections between agents. We show how bringing together the diverse, often disconnected, theoretical and methodological approaches illuminates the applicability of herding to many domains of cognition and suggest that cognitive neuroscience offers a novel approach to its study.

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Contrary to common belief, our preferences do not only shape our decisions but are also shaped by what decisions we make. This effect, known as choice-induced preference change, has been extensively studied in individuals. Here we document choice-induced preference change in groups. We do so by using the choice-blindness paradigm, a method by which participants are given false feedback about their past choices. Participants are given a second round of choices following the choice blindness manipulation´measuring preference change resulting from accepting the manipulation. In Experiment 1 (N=83), we introduce a roommate selection task used in this paper and use it to replicate choice-induced preference change using choice-blindness in individuals. In Experiment 2 (N=160), dyad members made mutual choices in the roommate selection task and then receive either veridical or false feedback about what choice they made. The majority of the false feedback trials were accepted by the dyads as their own choices, thereby demonstrating choice blindness in dyads for the first time. Dyads exhibited choice-induced preference change and were more likely to choose the originally rejected option on trials where they accepted the manipulation compared to control trials. In Experiment 3 (N=80), we show that the preference effect induced by the choice blindness manipulation at the group level does not generalize back to follow up choices made by individual participants when removed from the group. In all studies, response time analyses further support our conclusions. Choice-induced preference change exists for both individuals and groups, but the level at which the choice was made constrains the influence of that choice on later preferences.