The identification of strategic interactions among local governments is typically plagued by endogeneity problems. I exploit the fact that local jurisdictions located close to a state border have some neighbors in another state and instrument the tax rate of neighbor jurisdictions with the state-level tax rate of the neighboring state. I use this instrument to identify strategic personal income tax setting by local jurisdictions in Switzerland and find that tax rates are strategic substitutes. I then develop a residence-based personal income tax competition model and show that tax rates are strategic substitutes if the elasticity of the marginal utility of the public good with respect to the tax rate is above one. This is notably the case in the presence of economies of scale in the public good provision. (JEL H24, H71, H73, H77)

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Interjurisdictional competition over mobile tax bases is an easily understood mechanism, but actual tax-base elasticities are difficult to estimate. Political pressure for reducing tax rates could therefore be based on erroneous estimates of the mobility of tax bases. We show that tax competition provided the most prominent argument in the policy debates leading to a succession of reforms of bequest taxation by Swiss cantons. Yet, canton-level panel data spanning multiple bequest tax reforms over a 36-year period suggest the relevant tax base, high-income retirees, to be relatively inelastic with respect to tax rates. The alleged pressures of tax competition did not seem in reality to exist.

We design a parsimonious spatial equilibrium model featuring workers embodied with heterogeneous skills and non-homothetic preferences. In equilibrium, locations with improved commuting access become relatively more attractive to high-income earners. We empirically analyse the effects of the construction of the Swiss highway network between 1960 and 2010 on the population size and composition of municipalities. We find that the advent of a new highway access led to a long-term 24% increase in the share of top-income taxpayers and a 8% decrease in the share of low-income taxpayers, impacting segregation by income. Highways also contributed to job and residential urban sprawl.

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